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In continued celebration of our 20th anniversary, James Madison University (JMU) honored CISR at a JMU’s annual Capitol 
Hill reception in Washington, D.C. on 10 June 2016. Attended by Director Stan Brown from the Office of Weapons Removal and 
Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA), JMU President Johnathan Alger, 
nearly 200 JMU area alums, and mine action friends from Legacies of War, Marshal Legacy Institute and the Organization 
of American States, the event celebrated CISR’s legacy in a fantastic evening with friends and colleagues. With a full house of 
around 200 guests, both Brown and Alger offered warm sentiments and recognized the strong commitment of those in the in-
dustry to have a lasting impact on the world. As the field of humanitarian mine action and conventional weapons destruction 
(CWD) continues to adapt and evolve, we celebrate our past while looking to our future.
In this issue, we’re excited to feature mobile technologies, their benefits, challenges and current usage in programs around the 
world. Camille Wallen and Nick Torbet from The HALO Trust discuss their experience using the Fulcrum mobile application 
to collect and analyze data in Laos. Elisabeth Vinek, Sulaiman Mukahhal, and Olivier Cottray from the Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) look at how the newly adopted IMSMA development strategy will foster better 
interoperability between the national storage component, IMSMA Core, and other external applications. Torsten Vikström 
from Spinator AB presents the EU-funded TIRAMISU Information Management System (T-IMS), a mobile field data collec-
tion tool for humanitarian demining that was field tested in Croatia by deminers and surveyors from the Croatian Mine Action 
Centre. And Hayashi Ontoku Akihito, a Japan International Cooperation Agency adviser to the Lao National Unexploded 
Ordnance Programme, reports on the Easy Sketch Map application, which facilitates more efficient, on-site map making.
Our next (Fall 2016) issue will spotlight the Middle East and North Africa: How are illicit small arms and light weapons 
(SA/LW) and CWD proliferation currently affecting these regions? What broader issues are connected to illicit SA/LW (public 
health, gender, youth, crime)? In addition, issue 20.3 will feature articles on weapons marking and tracing, how illicit weapons 
affect humanitarian deminers’ and community safety, as well as creative ways to reduce the negative effect of illicit SA/LW in 
communities while improving weapons ammunition security. 
Moreover, I’m excited to announce that we have released topics for issues 21.1, 21.2, and 21.3, which will encompass impro-
vised explosive devices (IEDs) and pressure plate IEDs—a new focus for The Journal—as well as a special report section on 
Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years following the end of the Bosnian War in December 1995 and the Balkan floods of May 
2014. For more information on upcoming topics, please visit us online at www.jmu.edu/cisr. 
http://www.jmu.edu/CISR
improving lives since 1996.
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Editorial
Implementing International 
Obligations to Clear Mines
by Stuart Casey-Maslen
E ach State Party to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) that knows or suspects it has areas under its jurisdiction or control that contain 
anti-personnel (AP) mines has a clear deadline to locate and 
destroy those mines. According to Article 5(1), upon becom-
ing party to the APMBC, a State must complete clearance 
within ten years, unless the deadline is pushed back in an 
agreement from the other States Parties at an annual meeting 
or five-yearly review conference.1 
The nature of the obligation is to make every effort to find 
all mined areas with AP mines in areas located on sovereign 
territory or on territory a State effectively controls abroad. 
Once a suspected mined area is confirmed as contaminated, 
the State Party must then destroy all the AP mines contained 
therein. In practice, however, all does not really mean all. This 
is the understandable result of technological constraints allied 
to the explicit introduction of risk-management methodology 
into demining operations. Detection technology limits the 
depth at which AP mines, especially those with minimum-
metal content, will be identified. Mines that lie more than a 
dozen or so centimeters below the surface will likely remain 
undetected; however, some may rise in the months or years 
following clearance operations, presenting an ongoing threat 
to life and limb. Similarly, a decision must be taken as to 
which areas are subjected to full clearance and at which point 
this will start and end. The result of this decision may be that 
actual contamination is unwittingly overlooked. 
In reality, the problem with demining is less that adjacent 
areas contaminated with mines are missed. Far more often, 
operations focus and persist in areas that palpably are 
not contaminated with explosive devices, which impede 
efficiency. Poor survey techniques and fear of legal liability in 
some instances meant that operators and national programs 
have eschewed risk-management methods in favor of ultra-
cautious (and ultra-expensive) approaches. Any ongoing mine 
clearance operation that does not locate a single mine (or other 
explosive threat) within ten days should ask itself whether it is 
working in the right place.
But while many States Parties seem to regard time as an 
infinite resource, funds—whether national or international—
are most assuredly not. Even without the dictates of financial 
austerity and blossoming budget deficits, funding for mine 
clearance operations would already be in decline. The increas-
ingly steep decline that we are currently witnessing will only 
accelerate in coming years, though major support for specif-
ic operations will likely still be available in case of overriding 
humanitarian need (e.g., should peace break out in Syria).
What does this mean for the implementation of the 
APMBC? 
First, the generosity of extension periods with which States Parties have too 
frequently rewarded sluggishness and inefficiency must come 
to an end. Granting long extensions to laggard programs 
scarcely encourages positive change. Moreover, if a State Party 
is willfully failing to make every effort to confirm mined 
areas and then clear them “as soon as possible” (as Article 5 
demands), they should not be granted an extension.1 The legal 
reality should reflect the political and operational realities: 
that a State Party is in violation both of the APMBC and of 
international law. The notion of State responsibility means 
that a State should indeed be held responsible for its actions 
and its inaction. The current approach of the States Parties 
is to reward failure and willful inaction, hardly one that is 
conducive to encourage accountability and responsibility. 
“Any ongoing mine clearance operation that does not locate 
a single mine (or other explosive threat) within ten days 
should ask itself whether it is working in the right place.”
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Second, the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) needs to up its game 
materially. The new director, recently appointed, should ensure 
that extension requests are not just checked for formalist and 
procedural issues, but also that the review assesses whether 
the data is robust and coherent, and that the associated plans 
are ambitious and evidence-based. One 2016 extension request 
that was on the cusp of being submitted, and which the ISU 
reviewed, contained an unacceptable number of logical 
blunders and glaring mathematical errors. To ensure this does 
not reoccur, States must support the ISU with the necessary 
financial, human, and technical resources and requisite 
mandate to enable the ISU to do its work professionally.
Third, oversight of demining programs in affected States Parties needs to be 
enhanced. This is a task for donor States and operational ex-
perts. It is time the cooperative duty to facilitate and clarify 
compliance under APMBC Article 8(1) is applied directly to 
operations. With the consent of the territorial State, a mission 
of experts is an informal mechanism and no threat to sover-
eignty; a State Party that has nothing to hide should seek to 
hide nothing. Every year two or three States, especially those 
imminently seeking an extension, could be assessed without 
significant financial outlay on anyone’s part and then support-
ed where necessary.
Fourth, it is a regrettable reality that while lip service is paid to land 
release, in many programs the risk-management processes 
inherent in the concept are, in the words of Hamlet, “more 
honor’d in the breach than in the observance.” Although land-
mine impact survey methodology has received the last rites, 
the wilder estimates of massive, widespread contamination 
and devastating impact that it falsely generated still call to us 
from beyond the grave. Today, far too few States can proffer a 
rational estimate of contamination based on confirmed and 
not just suspected mined areas. This is even the case in States 
with demining programs that have been ongoing for two de-
cades or longer. Investing in high-quality non-technical sur-
vey is a major operational requirement, not an optional extra. 
From 28 November to 2 December 2016, States Parties and 
States not yet party to the APMBC will convene in Santiago, 
Chile, for the fifteenth meeting of the States Parties. Will it be 
business as usual? Another triumph of diplomatic form over 
operational substance? Or will States Parties finally grasp the 
mettle and resolve to make the Maputo Review Conference 
pledge of well-nigh completing global clearance by 2025 an 
operational reality?  
See endnotes page 67
The author is editor of the Mine Action Review, produced 
by Norwegian People’s Aid, and honorary professor at the 
University of Pretoria’s Faculty of Law. This article is written in 
an individual capacity.
on
https://issuu.com/cisr-journal
Stuart Casey-Maslen, Ph.D. 
Norwegian People’s Aid
200 chemin des Golettes
Chevry, 01170 / France
Email: stuartm@npaid.org
Website: http://www.mineactionreview.org
Stuart Casey-Maslen, Ph.D. is 
an international lawyer working 
for Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) 
as an editor of the Mine Action 
Review, published by NPA. He 
is an honorary professor at the 
University of Pretoria (South 
Africa) and holds a doctorate in 
international humanitarian law as well as master’s 
degrees in international human rights law and forensic 
ballistics. He has written a commentary of the Anti-
Personnel Mine Ban Convention and co-edited a 
commentary of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
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MOBILE DATA COLLECTION: 
INTEROPERABILITY THROUGH 
NEW ARCHITECTURE
by Elisabeth Vinek, Sulaiman Mukahhal and Olivier Cottray  
 [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ] 
FEATURE
Information management (IM) requires close collabora-tion between all parties in a mine action program and can-not be carried out in isolation. Effective IM involves tools 
as well as organizational processes that clearly define how 
different parties interact and function with IM. As depicted 
in Figure 1, without adequately defining processes through 
National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) and Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOP), even the most advanced and fit-
for-purpose IM tools will lack the foundation to be effective.
Carefully integrating IM tools into the processes of an orga-
nization becomes increasingly important as more specialized 
tools become available. Recently, a number of applications 
were developed in the mine action community, many of them 
mobile data collection tools that address very specific require-
ments and needs.1,2,3,4
Mobile Collection Tools
The proliferation of mobile devices is increasing demand 
for mobile-based data collection solutions that bridge the 
information gaps in mine action programs. 
Operators and contractors in the field in-
creasingly rely on mobile solutions to collect 
data about survey and clearance as well as 
other related activities.
The availability of easy-to-use software 
and development frameworks for common 
mobile platforms such as Android and iOS 
contributes to the proliferation of such tools. 
Designing a custom data collection form for 
a team being deployed to the field and mak-
ing it available via mobile devices is a task 
that can be accomplished in a relatively short 
amount of time. Most tools can work offline 
and are able to synchronize data once an 
internet connection is reestablished.
The immediate benefit of using mobile data collection is 
real-time data sharing and analysis, and real-time tracking 
of deployed assets. It enables decision makers within mine 
action organizations to have quick access to information 
and make evidence-based decisions to implement and steer 
activities. Automatic georeferencing uses GPS functionalities 
built into devices and is another frequently mentioned benefit. 
Additionally, mobile data collection reduces the complexity 
of reporting by avoiding error-prone, double data entry (e.g., 
entering data via paper forms as well as manually entering 
data into a national information management system).
However, this synchronization with a central, national sys-
tem presents a significant challenge. When different tools are 
used by various organizations to collect the same type of data, 
data is both stored in different locations, formats and technol-
ogies. In order to make informed decisions on a national lev-
el and preserve the data in the longer term, we must combine 
data into a single location. This requires robust data exchange 
mechanisms and standards.
TOOLS
PROCESSES
ORGANIZATION
IMSMA System 
Development Program
IM Capacity
Development Program
Software, Hardware
 Functionalities
Data exchange protocols
  APIs and languages
Clear SOPs/NMAS
  QM processes
    communication
Mainstreaming with
  operational processes
Management buy-in
Skilled personnel
Figure 1. IM hierarchy of needs and GICHD information management support  
programs.
All graphics courtesy of GICHD.
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National Information Management Systems 
As required by the national authority, many programs 
store country-wide mine action data in the Information 
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). Normally, 
data is collected by users in the field and sent to the national 
authority—either as paper reports, or digitally as Excel files or 
similar formats—and entered manually or imported into the 
central IMSMA database.
With so many different mobile data collection tools, there 
is an increased demand for a simple and robust data exchange 
functionality between said tools and IMSMA. One key 
element for data exchange is a common, well-documented 
data format that can be used to transfer data between two 
systems. For mine action, this requirement is addressed by 
the Mine Action Extensible Markup Language (maXML), 
which was originally developed in 2002 by identifying data 
that members of the mine action community are interested 
in sharing based on interviews and a review of various mine 
action information systems, standards and processes. It has 
been further developed since then by adding vocabulary that 
reflects the developments of the data that IMSMA contains. 
The maXML specification expresses these data as easily 
recognizable terms or words, and presents these terms in a 
structure that gives context to their meaning and intent. These 
terms and structure represent the maXML vocabulary. In 
most cases, the maXML vocabulary adheres to terminology 
used by the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
While the export and import of maXML are implement-
ed within IMSMA, the current IMSMANG only partially 
addresses wider requirements for a seamless data exchange 
with third-party applications. In fact, national storage and 
validation of mine action data is only one step in the informa-
tion management cycle (depicted in Figure 2) that IMSMANG 
must support.
The identification of information requirements—data col-
lection, analysis and reporting—are addressed equally by the 
current IMSMANG. As it was originally conceived as a holis-
tic tool, the ability to exchange data easily, while impor-
tant, was not central to its design. Therefore no Application 
Programming Interface (API) is available to expose and lever-
age IMSMA business logic and functionality.
The emerging third-party applications mentioned previ-
ously cover specific steps of the information management 
cycle such as data collection via mobile devices or reporting 
through the Mine Action Intelligence Tool (MINT).4 By fo-
cusing on one specific requirement, applications often out-
perform the one-size-fits-all IMSMANG, which must meet 
multiple requirements. Acknowledging these technological 
trends and new opportunities, GICHD initiated a new devel-
opment cycle in 2015 focusing on IMSMA’s role of data stor-
age, validation and integration.
Motivation for Change
Regular updates to IMSMA are required in order to keep 
pace with evolutions in information technology. However, 
these updates also provide opportunities to rethink macro- 
level architecture and to take into account lessons learned from 
previous years, taking advantage of technological developments. 
Information 
reporting
Information
requirements
identication
Data
collection
Data
validation
and storage
Data analysis
Identify the most 
relevant data needs to
steer mine action in a 
country/programme
Collect data in the eld, 
during various steps of 
the land release process 
and related activities
Geographical and 
numerical analysis, 
creation of maps, 
apps, dashboards
Reporting to
conventions (e.g.,
APMBC), to donors,
headquarters,
to operators, etc.
Figure 2. Information Management Cycle.
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With its adapted strategy and new development cycle, 
GICHD aims to address evolving and emerging requirements 
regarding user experience and interoperability with third-
party applications. Moreover, GICHD will more efficiently 
employ off-the-shelf tools for mine action tasks. This will 
reduce costs and the need for specific technical system 
support, freeing up both GICHD and field IM resources to 
provide user-driven information products such as maps, 
reports and statistics.
In many programs, the core function of IMSMA is a plat-
form to store and validate national data, while other functions 
such as data collection and analysis can be performed by spe-
cialized third-party applications. As a result, the current ob-
jective of the strategy is to strengthen this now-called IMSMA 
Core component and open it up for easy integration with data 
from a variety of sources. This will be achieved by defining an 
IMSMA framework including a revised maXML specification 
and an API allowing for seamless exchange of data and func-
tionalities. In this sense, IMSMA should no longer be under-
stood as a singular tool but as a system: a set of interrelated 
tools and processes that operate together to provide the sector 
with sound IM.
In IMSMA’s new strategy, each step in the process can be 
carried out by a variety of standard or customized tools devel-
oped either by GICHD or by third-party developers provided 
these tools are interoperable, i.e., that they can communicate 
data between one another in a standardized and reliable man-
ner. Figure 3 illustrates how this strategy supports all stag-
es of the information management cycle. To accomplish this, 
GICHD will develop and maintain a robust mine action data 
exchange language—maXML and API—allowing for a stan-
dardized exchange of data and functionality between differ-
ent tools in the system. In this way, GICHD seeks to foster and 
encourage an ecosystem of user-driven, interoperable, modu-
lar tools that can quickly leverage rapid advances in technol-
ogy and more effectively put IM into the hands of mine action 
and relevant operational stakeholders.
The key objectives of the new IMSMA development strat-
egy are
• To provide a common IMSMA framework under which 
a family of tools developed by different organizations 
for mine action can operate. This framework will pro-
vide an environment where different tools are compat-
ible with IMSMA Core.
Figure 3. Vision of a future information management system for mine action.
Organization and processes
(Information requirements denition)
Apps
(Data collection and entry)
IMSMA Core
(Data validation and storage)
Geoservices
(Data analysis)
External data
sources
MINT
(Reporting)
Information Management
System
for Mine Action
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• To design a data model that facilitates analysis of data 
through tools such as GIS and IMSMA MINT thereby 
contributing to more efficient planning of mine action 
operations and potentially other humanitarian sectors. 
• To provide an IM system that is user friendly and re-
quires minimal specialized training. This will free up 
GICHD’s IM advisors to provide support on IM meth-
ods and will free up IM staff in partner organizations 
to focus on data analysis rather than technical issues.
• To facilitate easy and cost-efficient adaptation 
of IMSMA to evolving business processes.
• To reduce maintenance costs of custom-built tools in 
the future.
03 Third-party IMSMA Applications
Applications developed and maintained by
third parties and compatible with the IMSMA
framework
01 IMSMA Core
National storage and data
validation component
02 GICHD IMSMA Applications
Applications developed and maintained by
or upon request of the GICHD and building
on IMSMA Core’s API and maXML standard
Transactional (data in)
Analytical (information out)
Figure 4. IMSMA applications.
Implementation 
While the development of IMSMA Core has only just start-
ed, the overall framework has taken shape, and tools for the 
various steps of the IM cycle have matured. Figure 4 specifies 
the vocabulary used for those applications, depending on their 
level of engagement with IMSMA.
•  IMSMA Core refers to the central storage and data  
validation component with its data 
exchange functionalities.
•  GICHD IMSMA applications refer to applications 
developed and maintained by or upon 
request of the GICHD and builds on IMSMA 
Core’s API and the maXML standard.
Figure 5. Overview of MARS.
• NTS Reporting
• Tech Survey Reporting
• Clearance Reporting
• Etc.
•  Organizational Admin Control•  MARS Cloud Interface•  Data Export
•  Secure Data Storage
•  Integration with MINT
•  Integration with IMSMA
MARS APP MARS WEB PORTAL
MARS CLOUD
MINT IMSMA
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• Third-party IMSMA applications refer to applications 
developed and maintained by third parties that are 
compatible with the IMSMA framework (i.e., they are 
able to exchange data with IMSMA Core and/or use the 
IMSMA Core API).
One example of a recently developed mobile data collec-
tion tool falling under the IMSMA applications category is 
the Mine Action Reporting System (MARS), which comprises 
three main parts: 
• a field data entry mobile application (MARS Mobile) 
• a web-based data management and administration por-
tal (MARS Web) 
• a cloud-based data storage (MARS Cloud). 
After initial configuration via MARS Web, authorized users 
can collect data in the field using customized data entry forms 
or forms designed in IMSMA and imported into MARS. The 
mobile application allows GPS information to be captured 
as identifying points and polygons with a few finger taps. As 
soon as the mobile device is connected to the internet, the col-
lected data is synchronized with the MARS Cloud and acces-
sible for approval via the web portal. Finally, data collected via 
MARS can be imported into the IMSMA data repository and 
accessed via MINT for advanced data analysis and reporting 
purposes. As depicted in Figure 5, MARS is an example of an 
application integrated within the current status of the IMSMA 
framework and will be adapted as IMSMA Core and its API 
and data exchange capabilities mature.
Conclusion
The newly adopted IMSMA development strategy (2015–
2018) aims at fostering better interoperability between the na-
tional storage component, IMSMA Core, and external 
applications such as mobile data collection. This interopera-
bility will be achieved through an IMSMA framework that de-
fines how various IM systems may interact. This development 
will take place in parallel to the maintenance and support of 
the current IMSMANG system that will continue beyond the 
development timeline of IMSMA Core. 
See endnotes page 65
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FROM THE FIELD: MOBILE 
TECHNOLOGIES FOR MINE ACTION 
by Torsten Vikström [ Spinator AB ]
Breakthroughs in technology development trans-formed desktop computers into small, powerful mobile units equipped with intelligent software and 
extensive possibilities to connect and interact. Alternatively, 
the world of mine action still depends on manual work done 
with pen and paper, and the process of field data collection 
is especially exposed. However, field tests show that the use 
of mobile technology vastly improves safety and increas-
es the effectiveness of field work. Adapting to new mobile 
technologies for field data collection will also positively af-
fect the ways in which we gather, share, analyze, monitor 
and evaluate information.
TIRAMISU
Through the TIRAMISU project, the European Union as-
sumed the task of boosting clearance efforts in countries 
plagued by war and conflict.1 This project, which received 
funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework 
Programme (FP7) for research, technology development and 
demonstration under grant agreement n° 284747, has engaged 
26 partners from 12 countries.
The objective of the TIRAMISU project is to provide the 
mine action community with a toolbox to assist in address-
ing the many issues related to humanitarian demining, thus 
promoting peace, national and regional security, conflict 
prevention, social and economic rehabilitation and post- 
conflict reconstruction. 
One outcome of this project is the TIRAMISU Information 
Management System (T-IMS), a mobile field data collection 
tool for humanitarian demining. T-IMS is a software appli-
cation for deminers and surveyors in the field. GIS centric, 
the app is built for touch technology and functions without 
the need for a keyboard or mouse.2,3 Emphasis was placed 
on the “ease-of-use” aspect, which means system data and 
T-IMS with Bluetooth connected GPS and binocular rangefinder.
All photos courtesy of © Spinator AB.
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A hand-drawn map containing critical information. Is this the best we can do?
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information from the field can easily be captured. This in-
cludes the ability to mark suspected and confirmed hazard-
ous areas (SHA/CHA); map sketches; identify and locate 
landmines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other find-
ings; take geo-referenced photos, videos and interviews with 
voice recordings; use GPS tracking and more. The system 
supports non-technical survey (NTS), technical survey (TS), 
mine/UXO clearance, quality assurance (QA), quality control 
(QC), and structured reporting and analyses. It does not re-
quire an internet connection and is fully functional offline. 
Furthermore, T-IMS optionally contains the Collaborative 
ORDnance Data Repository (CORD), designed and developed 
by Ripple Design and Mindlark, and hosted and managed 
by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery 
(CISR) at James Madison University (JMU).4 CORD provides 
access to approximately 5,000 ordnance objects offline. 
As incorporating standards are of great importance, the 
system is compliant with the Mine Action Extensible Markup 
Language (maXML), a data specification integration stan-
dard, which can exchange information with the Information 
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), devel-
oped by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD).5 The system also uses standardized map 
symbology for mine action to avoid the misinterpretation of 
sensitive information.6
Operational Validation in Croatia
In 2015, T-IMS was validated by the Croatian Mine Action 
Centre (CROMAC), whose team was authorized to validate 
TIRAMISU tools.7 During validation, T-IMS was tested for 
several months in field survey operations by CROMAC de-
miners and surveyors. CROMAC survey experts provided 
the basis for the validation procedure. CROMAC’s validation 
team concluded that T-IMS
• Enables precise collection of geospatial data in the field 
and can store the collected data in the information 
management system (IMS). 
• Improves the general survey processes and SHA analy-
ses by allowing information collected in the field to be 
directly transferred into the IMS. This reduces the time 
needed to update the IMS and expedites decision mak-
ing and prioritization processes. 
• Improves the safety of field activities by recording sur-
veyor and geospatial positioning.
Cambodia Field Experience: Battambang Province
With a long history of war and conflict, Cambodia is still 
one of the most contaminated countries in the world. In 
northwestern Cambodia, the Battambang province has had 
more landmine casualties than any other province in the 
country. Between 2005 and 2007, a total of 2,588 accidents 
Briefing in the tent at the benchmark of minefield #06926 by a CMAC team leader before entering the minefield.
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were reported in the Battambang province.8 Ten years later, 
landmines still cause injury and death.
In March 2016, the author visited Cambodia with GICHD 
to field test T-IMS. Conducted together with the Cambodian 
Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), 
the evaluation took place in three different minefields in the 
Banan district of Battambang province, where the Cambodian 
Mine Action Centre (CMAC) was conducting clearance oper-
ations. The system was used for NTS, TS, QA and QC activities 
on these operational sites. 
For the field tests, the team loaded overview maps of 
the area from OpenStreetMap into the map module and 
equipped the system with the ordnance database CORD for 
off line use.9 Small, Bluetooth-compatible handheld GPS de-
vices were also included to show the current position of the 
user in the map module.
During NTS and TS, the team documented all three mine-
fields directly into the system. SHAs and CHAs were plotted 
directly into the map module. The turning points (i.e., fixed 
points on the ground that indicate a change in direction of the 
perimeter) of these areas had longitudinal and latitudinal val-
ues previously recorded by CMAC and were thus entered into 
T-IMS to create SHAs and CHAs.6 The team drew boundaries 
and safe points, documented and posi-
tioned benchmarks in the T-IMS map 
module (i.e., reference points that indi-
cate hazards or hazardous areas outside 
the SHA or CHA), and identified land-
mines via CORD (e.g., PMN-2, POMZ-2 
and Type 72).6 Geo-referenced pho-
tos and videos were recorded, and GPS 
tracking was enabled to capture the 
team’s (safe) route through the mine-
fields. The system documented clear-
ance priorities and the progress of the 
survey and clearance activities to cre-
ate a snapshot of the current situation 
as of area cancelled, area cleared, and 
area reduced following the process of 
land release. 
The system also documented QA/
QC activities on the largest minefield 
(457,000 square meters or 546,567 
square yards). During QA/QC activ-
ities, the team used the NTS and TS 
tools as well as the quality management 
tools with standardized QA/QC input forms to make addi-
tional voice recordings, take videos and photos, interact with 
the map, perform GPS tracking and use the ordnance module 
CORD to strengthen the QA/QC reports. Documentation of 
the three minefields occured directly in the field without any 
modifications or additional office work. Each report took an 
estimated 15 to 30 minutes to complete. 
The surveyors, clearance personnel, QA/QC and manage-
ment staff of both CMAA and CMAC appreciated the sim-
plicity of T-IMS in both usage and information collection; the 
GPS connectivity, which displayed actual positions in the field 
and simultaneously used GPS to add and draw points, lines, 
and polygons; and the access to an offline ordnance database, 
which gives instant access to approximately 5,000 ordnance 
objects such as landmines and types of UXO. 
Offline Ordnance Database
During field activities, having direct and instantaneous ac-
cess to an offline ordnance database (such as CORD) as a part 
of a mobile field data collection tool is of great value for sur-
veyors and clearance personnel. Facilitating risk assessment 
and situation awareness, offline ordnance databases provide 
improved security for those involved in operational activities. 
Statistics and geographical information on mines and UXO 
Ordnance objects identified with CORD in the T-IMS ordnance module.
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Inspection of an area cleared by a machine as part of the QA activity.
from past clearance operations can improve decision making 
for clearance personnel planning in nearby regions.
Conclusion
In addition to being easy to use, GIS-based mobile tools 
must also support the global processes of humanitarian mine 
action by allowing data to be collected, stored and reported in 
a standardized manner. Once information is automatically 
processed from surveyors’ or deminers’ work in the field— 
including recorded interviews, geo-referenced photos, draw-
ings of CHAs, plotted GPS tracks—and inserted into the in-
formation management system (e.g., IMSMA), where it is 
collected for further processing, aggregation, analyses and 
sharing, only then will we see the true benefits of mobile tech-
nology in the field.  
See endnotes page 65
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MOBILE TECHNOLOGY IN MINE 
ACTION: THE FULCRUM APPLICATION
by Camille Wallen and Nick Torbet [ The HALO Trust ]
In 2014, The HALO Trust (HALO) began trialing Fulcrum, a mobile data collection application for survey developed by Fulcrum Mobile Solutions. Due to the success of the tri-
al, the subscription-based commercial product, designed spe-
cifically for mobile data collection, was used in eight HALO 
programs. Using Fulcrum, HALO has created 35 applica-
tions that collect data for a variety of outputs, including rapid 
contamination assessments, socioeconomic and impact sur-
veys, minefield quality assurance checks, vehicle and logistics 
checks, and a number of reports including technical and non-
technical surveys, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), mine 
risk education (MRE), and daily minefield stats reports.
Enhancing Data Collection and Analysis
The principal benefit of Fulcrum is more efficient and accu-
rate data collection. Prior to using the app, HALO’s Cambodia 
program alone generated over 3,000 pages of paper reports ev-
ery month, all of which were entered manually into an in-
ternal operations database and the national International 
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. 
Since HALO introduced Fulcrum in its Cambodia pro-
gram, the data entry workload has reduced by over 70 percent. 
Survey teams, MRE teams and supervi-
sors now all carry Android tablets and 
use dual-language apps in Khmer and 
English created in Fulcrum. Each tab-
let has access to multiple applications 
for teams that require several different 
types of forms. In the field, data entered 
directly into the tablet can be export-
ed to HALO’s in-country database 
and converted into Extensible Markup 
Language (XML) format for submis-
sion to the national IMSMA database. 
The huge reduction in manual data en-
try means that the program informa-
tion management team can spend more 
time checking the quality of data and 
providing analysis. The system is also 
cost-effective, the increasing availabili-
ty of high-quality mobile devices and low subscription costs 
are met by increases in efficiency and the ability to scale up the 
system without putting significant strain on resources.
Using mobile technologies such as Fulcrum also enables 
the real-time management of teams in the field. Issues on the 
ground can be resolved immediately without the need to re-
turn to headquarters for problems to be identified and han-
dled at a later time. This has particular pertinence in insecure 
environments such as Syria and remote locations such as Laos.
Personnel do not need to be IT experts to use the applica-
tion. New applications such as survey forms can be created 
online in a matter of minutes, with little to no training re-
quired. To prevent data corruption or user errors, each de-
vice has a unique username. All input data is associated with 
specific devices and different levels of access are granted to 
administrators and users. The simplicity of setting up apps, 
exporting data and analyzing the results also means that one-
off studies can be conducted, assessments are rolled out rap-
idly and survey forms can be edited remotely when required, 
taking the burden off resource-intensive and time-consuming 
tasks. Moreover, the Fulcrum software developers are very re-
sponsive to adding new functions to the system in response to 
HALO staff in Cambodia receive training in Fulcrum.
All photos courtesy of The HALO Trust.
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requests from users such as HALO, en-
abling more advanced applications to be 
developed using the same simple tools.
Notably, the use of mobile technolo-
gy has increased the efficiency of socio-
economic surveys conducted pre- and 
post-clearance. The detail of these sur-
veys in paper form can create problems 
with time-consuming data entry, more 
opportunities for data entry errors and 
complex databases that are difficult to 
manage and analyze. Fulcrum has signif-
icantly enhanced the capacity of HALO’s 
community liaison and survey teams 
conducting this work, reducing the time 
required to conduct interviews, remov-
ing the requirement for separate data 
entry and enabling data to be exported 
and results to be analyzed remotely in 
HALO’s global headquarters. 
Challenges of Mobile Technology
While mobile technologies bring many benefits and pres-
ent multiple opportunities, they still present challenges, 
particularly in less developed countries. Tablets and smart-
phones require accessible data networks in order to upload 
reports. As teams can spend weeks at a time out in the field 
without access to a mobile data network or Wi-Fi, they are 
often unable to upload their collected data. While mobile de-
vices are able to store and collect data offline, Fulcrum can 
only back up to its cloud-based database, which requires in-
ternet access. If devices are unable to connect to a network, 
teams run the risk of losing any data that has not been up-
loaded were anything to happen to the device. Therefore, 
while HALO is exploring alternative solutions to backup data 
from Fulcrum in countries where data networks are poor or 
non-existent, pen and paper remains the primary collection 
method to avoid any large loss of data, time and work. While 
pen and paper and Fulcrum are sometimes used in conjunc-
tion with one another, the former is preferred for minefield 
survey reports whereas the latter is currently used for socio-
economic survey. This remains the largest restriction to the 
use of mobile technology in HALO programs. 
Exporting data from Fulcrum is easy; however, integrat-
ing the Fulcrum data into existing program databases can be 
more challenging, requiring time and attention from database 
and GIS managers to ensure the data synchronizes correct-
ly. Although not all Fulcrum users (teams, supervisors, etc.) 
require advanced IT skills or knowledge of HALO’s program 
databases, using remote technology can be challenging for 
those who have very little IT experience. Using smartphones 
can help to familiarize staff members with the technology, but 
additional training may be required for those who have no pri-
or experience with the technology before they feel comfort-
able and are proficient at using it in their daily work. 
Similarly, communities who are unfamiliar with smart-
phones or tablets may at first be suspicious of the technology 
during survey or interviews and may be unwilling to partici-
pate. It is therefore important to recognize where such an issue 
may occur and to mitigate any negative effects through com-
munity demonstrations or by using alternative methods that 
are familiar to the community.
Potential of Mobile Technology
Despite these challenges, mobile technologies can signifi-
cantly enhance the efficiency, effectiveness and accuracy of 
data collection. Applications such as Fulcrum can also be used 
to manage emergency situations remotely. By including pho-
tos and videos in reports on new item types that were recently 
found, field personnel can relay information to specialists in 
real-time, who can provide technical recommendations to the 
field team remotely. 
Mobile technology has a role to play in mine action op-
erations, and the ongoing development of systems such as 
Fulcrum enhances the capacity of operators in their everyday 
A HALO team leader and operations officer in Laos enter data in the field during tech-
nical survey.
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activities. HALO’s most advanced use of Fulcrum is in Laos, 
where it is used to assist with efforts to survey and clear UXO 
(unexploded ordnance) contamination.  
Case Study: HALO’s Use of Fulcrum in Laos
Laos remains heavily contaminated with UXO (particularly 
air-dropped submunitions) from the Indochina wars. Even 40 
years after the conflict, UXO continues to impact some of the 
most impoverished and isolated communities. Estimating the 
scale of the problem and mapping the extent of contamination 
has proven to be particularly challenging. HALO is working 
alongside other operators to both define and survey the extent 
of the submunition contamination as well as clear it. 
Much of the challenge can be attributed to the technical na-
ture of air-dropped cluster munitions, which distinguishes 
Laos from other demining programs. Submunitions were dis-
persed from aircraft and, in the vast majority of cases, were 
intended to function upon impact with the ground. The re-
sidual submunitions are those that failed to function as in-
tended, which present unique survey challenges; the dispersal 
pattern of submunition strikes is far more varied and wide-
spread than minefields, and records of their locations are far 
less precise. Even with local knowledge of contaminated areas, 
assessing and mapping submunition strikes for clearance is 
hugely challenging. Conversely, it also presents opportunities. 
Submunitions enable survey teams to enter a contaminated 
area physically and use hand-held metal detectors to con-
firm the extent of the contamination. This enables operational 
management to very accurately target 
follow-on clearance operations.
This technical survey process is 
fast-paced and data heavy. Any local-
ly reported submunition is known as 
an evidence point, and HALO’s GIS 
department overlays the surround-
ing area with a universal transverse 
Mercator (UTM) grid, divided into 
2,500 square meter boxes (50 x 50 m), 
a method introduced by Norwegian 
People’s Aid (NPA) in Laos as de-
scribed in an article in The Journal 
of ERW and Mine Action, issue 17.2.1 
Using MBTiles (mapping software 
that allows users to load map lay-
ers onto mobile devices for offline 
use), each box is assigned a unique 
ID, and survey teams search the box-
es surrounding each evidence point, 
recording the locations of any identified submunitions. The 
intent of the survey team is not to identify all submunitions 
within a single 50 x 50 m box, but only to determine if there 
is further evidence of contamination. In practice this usually 
means marking and destroying the first identified submuni-
tions in a box before moving on to surrounding boxes.
Given the extent of the bombing campaign, each box con-
tains a large amount of information (UXO identified, UTM 
locations, date searched, etc.), which needs to be central-
ly stored and monitored. Transferring this data by paper is 
time consuming and prone to human error. Data must be re-
corded by hand, called into the GIS department by phone or 
hand delivered and then manually entered into the operation-
al database. This is at best hugely inefficient and at worse un-
sustainable, given the scale of the task faced by in-country 
clearance operators. The problem is compounded when mul-
tiple strikes overlap one another, creating added complexi-
ties as survey officers have to contend with different strikes 
in close proximity that may require the survey of additional 
boxes. The use of the Fulcrum system means that teams can 
now reconcile all issues with a single visit rather than needing 
to revisit a single area multiple times in order to clarify out-
standing queries. 
Consequently, HALO has equipped all of its Laos survey 
teams with Samsung Tab4 tablets loaded with the Fulcrum 
app and connected to the country’s effective 3G network. 
HALO selected the Tab4 for its availability, price, and dura-
bility, although any mobile devices running Android or iOS 
A HALO Laos geographic information system specialist uses data sent from the field to 
map areas contaminated with submunitions.
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are suitable. Using Fulcrum, HALO’s operational manage-
ment team created several different forms, enabling the easy 
and accurate collection of data—ranging from socioeconomic 
information about impacted communities to EOD reports de-
tailing the location of destroyed UXO. The app is user friend-
ly, and the team can design and edit forms without requiring 
any significant technical knowledge. This flexibility allows 
HALO to ensure accurate and comprehensive data reporting. 
The Tab4 has proven to be remarkably durable during field 
operations, surviving months of rain during wet season op-
erations and constant use in jungle terrain. While there are 
occasional 3G coverage limitations, each team is able to syn-
chronize their data with headquarters daily, and in many cas-
es, they are able to live stream data. All data gathered during 
the survey process is downloaded as a Microsoft Excel file for-
mat and automatically entered into HALO’s Microsoft Access 
operational database. Links with the program’s GIS software 
(ArcGIS Desktop) then enables a visual representation of this 
data and by assigning a color code to each box (e.g., green for 
no cluster munitions found, red for found cluster munitions), 
operations management can then identify confirmed hazard-
ous areas (CHA) that can be entered into HALO’s work plan 
and national database.
Aside from the requirement for 3G coverage, some key les-
sons have been identified. First, when designing digital forms, 
it is important to minimize the amount of free-text data entry 
as possible, usually through the use of drop down menus. This 
hugely reduces problems associated with maintaining consis-
tent database records that are also symptomatic of paper re-
ports, such as changes in spaces, numbers or capital letters 
(e.g., variations on 105 millimeter artillery shells can include: 
105, 105 MM, 105 millimeter, and 105 mm). Second, the 
GPS technology within mobile devices is often not accurate 
enough for UXO survey purposes. Currently, separate data 
is manually entered into forms from more accurate Garmin 
GPS, but in the future HALO will look to GPS linked directly 
to the Tab4 via Bluetooth.
Cluster munition technical survey is intensely data driven, 
and GIS is a crucial component of the whole system. This mo-
bile technology has revolutionized HALO’s approach to UXO 
surveying in Laos, switching from paper maps and forms to 
integrated software that enables straight-forward data entry 
and visual representation. HALO is investigating what other 
support and management systems could be streamlined 
through the use of mobile data collection. In the near future, 
HALO Laos hopes to use apps such as Fulcrum to eliminate all 
paper reporting completely, enabling operational teams to re-
cord all of their daily statistics and synchronize immediately 
with headquarters. 
See endnotes page 65
An example of contamination mapping in Phonhai village, Laos, 
showing results of the technical survey.
Camille Wallen
Global Monitoring and Evaluation Manager
The HALO Trust
Tel: +1 202 331 1266
Email: camille.wallen@halotrust.org
Website: www.halotrust.org
Camille Wallen is HALO’s global 
monitoring and evaluation manager. 
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evaluation (M&E) across all HALO 
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technology in M&E. She is based in Washington D.C., 
though frequently travels around HALO’s programs.
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Program Manager, Laos
The HALO Trust
Email: Nicholas.torbet@halotrust.org
Website: www.halotrust.org
Nick Torbet arrived in Laos in 
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HALO in Cambodia, Colombia and 
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of the program. He previously 
served as a British Army officer for over ten years, 
specializing in explosive ordnance disposal.
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MOBILE TECHNOLOGIES: UXO LAO’S 
EASY SKETCH MAP
by Hayashi Ontoku Akihito [ JICA adviser to UXO Lao ]
Established in 1996, the Lao National Unexploded Ordnance Programme (UXO Lao) pro-
motes risk education and clears land 
for agriculture, community purposes 
(e.g., schools, hospitals, temples and 
water supplies) and other development 
activities. UXO Lao is working in the 
nine most impacted Lao provinces na-
tionwide. Although recent changes oc-
curred to UXO Lao’s survey procedure, 
the program continues mapping out 
contaminated areas throughout the 
country. 
Introduced in 2013, a new mobile 
technology altered survey operations 
to produce accurate maps for clearance 
work. In the past, organizations created 
maps by hand, which may have resulted 
in the production of less accurate maps. 
Moreover, the process of developing a 
map required time and multiple team 
members. The newly introduced ap-
plication, which works on an Android 
tablet, makes the operation faster and 
more accurate.
Past Operations
Before clearance could begin, UXO 
Lao’s procedure required the use of 
a sketch map for each clearance site. 
Initially, a four-member general survey 
team began by hand drawing a sketch 
map, which was time-consuming. A 
team would visit a site before clearance 
and use GPS to measure latitude and lon-
gitude, a compass for bearing between 
two turning points, and tape to measure 
distance between those turning points. 
A team member wrote down all neces-
sary information and brought this back 
Figure 1. UXO Lao’s procedure requires the use of a sketch map for each clearance site 
before beginning clearance.
All figures courtesy of the author.
Figure 2. The Easy Sketch Map mobile application enables survey teams to create 
sketch maps more efficiently.
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to the office, where the team continued working on the sketch 
map by calculating the size of the clearance site (see Figure 1). 
Used by UXO Lao in the past, this procedure required one to 
two hours to obtain all the necessary information at the site. 
In addition, creating a handwritten sketch map took the team 
another two to three hours.
Impact of Easy Sketch Map
The Easy Sketch Map application significantly altered the 
procedures of general survey operations, enabling the survey 
teams to create a sketch map faster and with less effort. With 
this application, a staff member from a general survey team 
walks along the boundary of a clearance site with a tablet and 
clicks a button at each boundary turning point. After recoding 
all of the turning points, the application automatically produc-
es a sketch map in portable document format (PDF) file, which 
the team can easily share and print out (see Figure 2).
This application reduces the workload of the general sur-
vey teams in two ways. First, the amount of time required to 
produce a map is reduced, because going through the manual 
process of creating a sketch map is no longer needed. Second, 
fewer team members are required. In the past, four staff mem-
bers of a general survey team had to work at the site, where-
as one staff member can produce a map using the application.
During the trial phase, a general survey team in a province 
produced a report comparing the old and new methods. They 
compared the accuracy of latitude and longitude, distance, 
bearing and the land size in respective methods. The result 
showed that the application met UXO Lao’s requirements and 
concluded that the application was capable of producing a map 
with the same accuracy as the old processes with less effort.
Technical Features
Apart from the practical function, the application has a 
number of technical features:
• The application can run on GPS-enabled tablets and 
smartphones equipped with Android 4.0 or above.
• Latitude is automatically corrected when determining 
the distance between turning points. The distance var-
ies depending on latitude even if the points are on the 
same longitude.
• Red, yellow and green lights indicate the accuracy of the 
GPS. A user clicks the recording button when the light 
turns green, ensuring the recording is accurate.
• The application produces a PDF file in vector graphics, 
so that lines and fonts are smooth and may be enlarged 
for displays and printed materials.
• The application produces a comma separated value (CSV) 
file of the recorded data, and can record and store mul-
tiple tasks.
The files are versatile in that the CSV format can be convert-
ed to keyhole markup language, which is accessible through 
Google Earth. This technical feature makes clearance site data 
accessible in multiple ways.
Instructors in the IT department at the National University 
of Lao developed the Easy Sketch Map application in 2013 with 
support from the technical cooperation project on IT, support-
ed by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). UXO 
Lao provided the information for the development of the ap-
plication, and the instructors contributed to its development. 
Japanese advisers took the lead during the initial stages in or-
der to define the specific requirements of UXO Lao, but Lao 
instructors developed the actual application. Thus, repair and 
maintenance of the application can be done locally, which is 
another advantage of the Easy Sketch Map application.
In 2015, general survey teams were renamed as non-
technical survey (NTS) teams, which have different functions 
from the general survey operation. Accordingly, the 
application’s functions need to be reviewed to meet the NTS 
teams’ needs.  
Hayashi Ontoku Akihito
JICA adviser
Phonsavang village, Chanthabouly district
Vientiane / Lao PDR
P.O. Box 345
Tel: (856-21) 418125-6
Fax: (856-21) 418124
Email: hayashi@bose.jpn.org
Website: http://uxolao.gov.la
Hayashi Ontoku Akihito is a JICA 
adviser to UXO Lao. He has worked 
with UXO Lao since 2012 and is 
responsible for a project supported 
by JICA to develop UXO Lao’s 
capacity in planning, monitoring 
and information management. 
Akihito is also coordinating a 
South-South Cooperation approach between UXO 
Lao and the Cambodian Mine Action Centre.
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Integrated Cooperation on Explosive 
Hazards Program in Central Asia
by Luka Buhin [ OSCE Office in Tajikistan ]
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office in Tajikistan (OiT) facilitates regional cooperation and coordination in the field of 
mine action in Central Asia, predominantly focusing on but 
not limited to inter-military cooperation. This approach falls 
under the OSCE concept of comprehensive and cooperative 
security. One of the best examples of this cooperation is the 
OSCE extra-budgetary project, the Integrated Cooperation on 
Explosive Hazards Programme (ICExH), which has been run-
ning since mid-2013. The project received financial support 
from the governments of Austria and the Netherlands in the 
past, while the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in 
the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military 
Affairs (PM/WRA) has provided funding since 2014. 
OSCE developed the project in an effort to improve the 
explosive hazards situation in Central Asia as well as in 
Afghanistan.1 This encompasses issues related to explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) and includes demilitarization of ex-
plosive ordnance and countering improvised explosive devic-
es (IED). 
Figure 1. Map of Central Asia.
Figure courtesy of OSCE/Umed Egamberdiev.
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Building Confidence in Central Asia 
Although the scale and threat of explosives hazards vary in 
Central Asia, the governments, military forces and humani-
tarian demining organizations face similar challenges—from 
the illicit use of abandoned or uncontrolled explosives, unsafe 
storage and transportation of munitions, to inadequate in-
vestment in the life management of serviceable ammunition.
A series of unplanned explosions at munitions sites in 
Central Asia during the 2000s— and particularly in Abadan, 
Turkmenistan, on 7 July 2011—demonstrated that the region-
al explosive hazards problem was a broader threat than those 
covered by the traditional framework of mine action, and in-
cluded the illicit use of abandoned and uncontrolled explo-
sives and the unsafe storage and transportation of munitions. 
Thus in early 2012, the OSCE OiT’s emphasis changed from 
a top-down regional coordination of mine action in Central 
Asia to a bottom-up approach via EOD, risk education and 
management trainings, conventional ammunition destruc-
tion, stockpile security, stockpile management, and the en-
couragement of regional technical dialogues during exchange 
visits. This important change in emphasis helped shape the 
design of the activities, outputs and intended outcomes of the 
ICExH project.
Understanding the Context
Developing regional projects demands an in-depth un-
derstanding of the context in which the project was initially 
developed and subsequently implemented. This was explic-
itly underlined in the external mid-term evaluation of the 
project.2 
 A number of factors affected the initial ICExH project:
• An absence of commonly accepted international norms 
and agreements related to conventional weapons de-
struction and humanitarian mine action.
• An absence of regional political consensus combined 
with a lack of enthusiasm to cooperate on regional se-
curity issues, as well as the perceived threat that cross-
border and/or regional cooperation, even on a technical 
level, may have significant political implications.
• Discrepancies between the expressed political will of 
countries in the region and poor implementation of 
stated intentions on the ground. This fact is also re-
flected on a country level where a hierarchical and for-
malized decision-making and decision-implementing 
system is practiced. 
• Discrepancies in understanding mine action (includ-
ing its components), since not all of the countries have 
Tajik and Afghan students share their experiences with EOD operations in Dushanbe, Tajikistan (November 2015).
Photo courtesy of OSCE/Nozim Kalandarov.
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established mine action programs. Consequently, pro-
grams differ between countries, i.e., from a predomi-
nately militarized approach to a mixed involvement of 
civilian, military and law enforcement agencies.
The challenging political-military situation in Afghanistan 
and elsewhere in Central Asia means that establishing and 
sustaining regional cooperation is difficult. Studies of cross-
border cooperation efforts in Central Asia show that effective 
regional cooperation takes time to develop and requires grad-
ual implementation.3 The ICExH project’s initial efforts to es-
tablish a regional mine action body to coordinate personnel 
and resources in Central Asia from the top-down were even-
tually abandoned in favor of focusing on tangible technical-
level cooperation. 
Building National and Regional Capacities 
Until recently, military forces predominately handled ex-
plosive hazard reduction and response tasks in Central Asia. 
The military capabilities in Central Asia are influenced by for-
mer Soviet military doctrine. In many instances, the military 
units’ demining procedures more closely resemble minefield 
breaching used in wartime than humanitarian demining de-
ployed in peacetime. Similarly, the standards used to store, 
transport and destroy munitions and other explosives fall 
short of today’s international peacetime norms. 
However, there are positive aspects to this. First, the States 
in the region are responding to explosive hazards challeng-
es with their own military forces, although the presence of 
international actors is required to a limited extent. Second, 
the development of demining and EOD capacities is clearly 
driven by the needs of military and security forces as well as 
the agenda of regional nations that wish to participate in U.N. 
peacekeeping operations requiring these capacities. 
In the development phase of the ICExH project, a partic-
ular challenge was to identify the common denominator of 
explosive hazards challenges in relation to national and re-
gional capacities. The project uses a decentralized approach in 
providing capacity-building opportunities via the Tajik and 
Kazakh Ministries of Defence as key national partners. In 
conjunction with the Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre 
(TNMAC), the Tajik Ministry of Defence already possesses 
capacities and experiences in mine action, including EOD. 
Similarly, the Kazakh Ministry has a well-established explo-
sive ordnance demilitarization program. Both of these allow 
the ICExH project to anchor the training programs within the 
existing structure(s) and/or future training school(s). 
An explosive hazards awareness instructor from DanChurchAid (DCA) in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, with students from Kyrgyz, Tajik and 
Turkmen Ministries of Defence (March 2015).
Photo courtesy of OSCE/Nozim Kalandarov.
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ICExH Project
The key objective of the ICExH project is to provide tar-
geted capacity development and technical assistance in re-
sponding to explosive hazards. This is done through IMAS 
compliant trainings focused on training instructors, ex-
changing information and shared best practices, and develop-
ing regional training institutions. The ICExH project is also 
designed to foster dialogue by providing a platform where 
mine action professionals in Central Asia are exposed to con-
temporary EOD, risk education and training management 
practices, which includes international standards and oper-
ating procedures.
 During the initial ICExH project training cycle from 
2014 to 2015, over 70 specialists from Afghanistan, Armenia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan at-
tended EOD level 1 through 3+ (IED disposal and explo-
sive ordnance demilitarization) and risk education courses. 
The EOD trainings were delivered in Dari, Russian and Tajik. 
The ICExH project’s second training cycle, which com-
menced in 2016, introduced Central Asian junior instruc-
tors to support the course’s delivery. Eight junior instructors 
from Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 
conjunction with senior instructors from the United States 
Army Central (USARCENT) delivered EOD level 1 and level 2 
courses in April 2016. 
In total, 55 civilian and military professionals from 
Central Asian States and Afghanistan traveled to Tajikistan 
(August 2013) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (November 2015). 
Furthermore, the ICExH project webpage was developed and 
is regularly updated to support networking and information 
sharing. The web page (www.osce-icexh.org/index.php/en) is 
available in English, Russian and Tajik.
At the project’s inception, the Tajik Ministry of Defence 
agreed to host a regional training program managed by the 
OSCE OiT. Additionally, the Ministry committed to establish-
ing the Regional Explosive Hazards Training Centre, which 
will host IMAS-compliant national and regional courses in 
explosive hazard reduction and response. During the summer 
of 2014, trainings were held in two locations: the Engineering 
Demining Regiment in Dushanbe and the Field Training 
Centre of the Military Institute in Lyaur. Additional con-
struction for a new, self-sufficient training center is planned 
to begin in late 2016. Moreover, with a signed tripartite mem-
orandum of understanding (MoU) between the Kazakh 
Ministry of Defence, OSCE Office in Astana and the OSCE 
A Tajik junior instructor, under mentorship of USARCENT, demonstrates subsurface clearance procedures during a battle area clear-
ance operation to Armenian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tajik students in Lyaur, Tajikistan (April 2016).
Photo courtesy of OSCE/Nozim Kalandarov.
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OiT, organizers can begin planning for the regional EOD level 
3+ demilitarization manager’s training in 2016 and 2017. 
Partnerships Nexus 
On average, between 30 and 40 governmental ministries 
and agencies, foreign embassies, and national and interna-
tional organizations from at least eight countries are engaged 
in the execution of a regional training course in Dari, Russian 
and Tajik.
USARCENT is the main training partner for the ICExH 
project. In addition to providing and delivering EOD courses 
level 1 through 3+ (IED awareness and disposal), USARCENT 
provided training ordnance and aids to the future regional 
training center of the Tajik Ministry of Defence. The explo-
sive hazard awareness and reduction pilot course implement-
ed in March 2015 was developed and delivered with in-kind 
support from the Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC), 
DanChurchAid (DCA) and the United Nations Mine Action 
Support Team (UNMAST) as a part of the United Nations 
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
The durable partnership between the OSCE OiT and the 
host country enables a seamless implementation of the proj-
ect at the ground level. The Tajik Ministry of Defence, in its 
capacity as the training program host, provides training ven-
ues, in-country logistic support and junior instructors, while 
TNMAC provides training certification and validation. 
Trainings are organized at the Tajik Ministry of Defence’s 
Engineering-Demining Regiment and at the Field Training 
Centre of the Military Institute.
In Kazakhstan, the tripartite MoU signed between the 
OSCE offices in Astana and Dushanbe as well as the Kazakh 
Ministry of Defence in August 2015, confirmed cooperation 
efforts from mid-2015 to mid-2018. The ICExH project’s wide 
partnership network is a testament of its regional prominence 
and of its partner nations’ interest to participate in this joint 
endeavor. It took OSCE OiT more than seven years to devel-
op such a network. Sustaining the ICExH project partnership 
network will maintain regional cooperation momentum in 
addressing the issues relating to explosive hazards in Central 
Asia.
Wider Impact of the ICExH Project
The ICExH project enhances and supports continuous 
technical explosive hazard coordination and dialogue, which 
encourages broader confidence and security building (CSB) in 
Central Asia. Currently, the project is the only consistent and 
ongoing CSB measure addressing the issue of explosive haz-
ards within the region.
In addition to supporting the progress of Central Asian 
States toward compliance with international disarmament 
A USARCENT instructor evaluates student performances during the student-led lessons on the EOD level 3 course in Dushanbe, 
Tajikistan (July 2015).
Photo courtesy of OSCE/Nozim Kalandarov.
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conventions, the ICExH project is helping to reduce threats to 
national security (i.e., IEDs laid by insurgents and terrorists, 
unplanned explosions at ammunition storage sites, and trans-
national crime). It also supports Central Asian States’ aspi-
rations to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations with 
their explosive hazards reduction and response capacities. 
Graduates of the trainings, seminars and exchange programs 
are technical specialists and managers who are influential in 
terms of shaping policy and implementation measures to re-
duce the threat posed by explosive hazards in the region.
The project also supports the establishment of the Regional 
Explosive Hazards Training Centre in Tajikistan and regional 
explosive ordnance demilitarization trainings in Kazakhstan. 
Training opportunities will be provided to military, security 
and law-enforcement forces as well as other relevant civilian 
agencies. The ICExH project supports the wider role of the 
OSCE in mobilizing actors and developing a cooperation plat-
form among its participant States in Central Asia. Through its 
multilateral capacity building and technical level dialogue ap-
proach, the OSCE OiT validates the case for confidence and 
security building in Central Asia. 
See endnotes page 65
A USARCENT instructor explains the necessity of collecting an IED’s forensic evidence on a mock-up device in Dushanbe, Tajikistan 
(October 2015).
Photo courtesy of OSCE/Nozim Kalandarov.
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Building Tajikistan’s National Capacity
by Bahriniso Shamsieva [ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe ]
Headquartered in Vienna, Austria, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is an international organization of 57 member States. Cur-
rently conducting 16 field missions, OSCE develops confidence 
building measures in the field of security while providing con-
flict-prevention capabilities and a capacity-building process 
for participating nations. These mine action activities are sup-
ported by the OSCE Permanent Council and implemented by 
field missions via partnerships with the host countries.
Contamination in Tajikistan
The Republic of Tajikistan is contaminated by land-
mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) as a result of civ-
il war from 1992 to 1997, insurgent incursions and mines 
laid along its borders. Tajikistan became a State Party to the 
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) on 1 April 
2000. Tajikistan made an explicit request to the OSCE Office 
in Tajikistan (OiT) to support the Tajikistan National Mine 
Action Programme in order to meet its obligations under 
Article 5 of the APMBC.
Supporting Demining Efforts in Tajikistan
In 2003, OSCE OiT began the first mine action program 
among all OSCE field missions. The mine action unit has a 
unique combination of capacities in the areas of program 
management, resource mobilization and management, and fa-
cilitation of cross-border cooperation efforts. The OSCE OiT 
mine action unit is developing and implementing projects on 
the national and regional levels. 
In 2009, OSCE OiT shifted its approach from donor-funded 
management to self-implemented mine action projects that 
develop national capacities. Since then, it has contributed to 
the clearance of over 1.7 million sq m of mine/UXO-affected 
land and the destruction of over 9,580 mines and UXO 
through manual and mechanical clearance.
Element of Success: Partnerships
In the frame of the national program, OSCE OiT close-
ly cooperates with the Republic of Tajikistan’s Ministry of 
Defence (MoD) and the Tajikistan National Mine Action 
Centre (TNMAC). With support from OSCE OiT, Tajikistan’s 
HDC personnel receive instruction from Supervisor Izzatov Yakub before entering the minefield.
Photo courtesy of Akbarov Firuz.
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MoD has become one of the key actors addressing mine/UXO 
threats in Tajikistan. The role of Tajkistan’s MoD within the 
Tajikistan Mine Action Programme is significant and rang-
es from temporarily seconding military personnel to assisting 
international demining operators in establishing the MoD’s 
own humanitarian demining capacities. In 2012, the Office 
for Military Cooperation and the U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe 
donated a Mini MineWolf to the MoD to help the humani-
tarian demining program remove mines located on the 
Tajik-Afghan border. Tajikistan’s MoD plans to use the Mini 
MineWolf in mine-contaminated areas within the country as 
well as abroad in peacekeeping operations.
TNMAC is the OSCE OiT counterpart in Tajikistan that 
facilitates implementation of humanitarian demining oper-
ations in close partnership with the MoD. In January 2014, 
TNMAC was established as a governmental institution with 
the responsibility to coordinate and regulate mine action- 
related activities in the country. It provides administra-
tive services and day-to-day oversight of the MoD demining 
teams in the field on behalf of the Tajikistan office. 
Since 2013, the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement 
in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military 
Affairs (PM/WRA) has been the main donor to the OSCE 
Mine Action Unit. Funding enables projects that support the 
government of Tajikistan in meeting its obligations under the 
APMBC and assists Tajikistan in developing its humanitar-
ian demining capacity. The project complements the national 
mine action strategy and annual working plans. The project 
aims to enhance the national humanitarian demining capac-
ity of the OSCE counterpart, TNMAC, and increase the re-
sources that can be deployed for mine clearance operations in 
the country.
Strategic Planning
With the support of OSCE OiT, the MoD’s 2013–2016 
strategic plan on humanitarian demining was developed 
to sustain Tajikistan’s capacities and efforts to fulfil its 
responsibilities to the APMBC and train subdivisions 
to participate in on-going peacekeeping operations. The 
Humanitarian Demining Company (HDC), working within 
the organizational structure of the MoD, will enhance its own 
capacity and will operate closely with TNMAC and all mine 
action stakeholders in Tajikistan. 
Additionally, the strategic plan is redefining the role of the 
MoD by mainstreaming its humanitarian demining capacities 
in support of building peace and stability through peacekeep-
ing operations beyond 2017. The proposed exit strategy envi-
sons the MoD deploying its humanitarian demining specialists 
and/or units of the HDC to peacekeeping operations and field 
missions abroad. Moreover, military and civilian personnel 
Quality Assurance Officer Kalandarov Saidnuriddin, and the head of HDC, Firuz Asadbekod, brief Afghan colleagues on humanitar-
ian demining operations during a field visit to the minefield in the Vanj district, Tajikistan.
Photo courtesy of Akbarov Firuz.
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who are engaged in mine action and are planning on taking 
part in U.N. peacekeeping operations in the region will benefit.
Conclusion
Through its mine action unit, OSCE OiT continues to im-
prove public security and build confidence at the national 
and regional levels. By coordinating tasks among mine action 
stakeholders in Tajikistan, OSCE OiT supports the govern-
ment as it fulfills its obligations under Article 5 of the APMBC 
by April 2020. It is also building a platform for Tajikistan to 
cooperate with the relevant government institutions and au-
thorities, regional counterparts, as well as the international 
mine action community and its donors.
After meeting the APMBC deadline, the government of 
Tajikistan will have a professional humanitarian demining 
capacity that works in accordance with all international stan-
dards and can be deployed to address any residual risk of ex-
plosive contamination that may arise. Tajikistan has also 
demonstrated that its HDC is prepared and equipped to par-
ticipate in U.N. peacekeeping operations as humanitarian 
mine action specialists. This would reinforce Tajikistan’s full 
membership in the international community, fostering self-
respect and dignity alongside the understanding and adop-
tion of wide-ranging humanitarian principles.
The OSCE mine action unit facilitates the legislative frame-
work for humanitarian mine action in Tajikistan for its capac-
ity development with a long-term, self-sustainable system. 
OSCE OiT will continue to support Tajikistan in addressing 
its mine/UXO problem and will continue to emphasize na-
tional capacity building. 
A Mini MineWolf machine in the Panj district along the Tajik-Afghan border.
Photo courtesy of OSCE/Azamjon Salohov.
Bahriniso Shamsieva 
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Afghanistan’s National Mine Action 
Strategic Plan (2016–2021)
by Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil [ United Nations Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan ]
Afghanistan suffers from severe landmine and explo-sive remnants of war (ERW) contamination, mostly as a result of the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989), inter-
nal conflict lasting from 1992 to 1996, and the United States-
led coalition intervention in late 2001.1 
There are around 617 sq km of areas remaining to be 
cleared as of end March 2016, new contamination is arising 
as a result of the  ongoing nationwide non-technical sur-
vey which covers both the contaminated areas left from the 
fighting (1979-2001) and the contamination resulted from 
the ongoing war since 2001 between the international forc-
es allied with the Afghan government against the non-State 
armed groups. Additionally, firing ranges used by interna-
tional forces throughout the past 14 years have also pro-
duced ERW contamination. Based on the Anti-Personnel 
Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) extension request work 
plan, all confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) and suspect-
ed hazardous areas (SHA) within the territory should be 
cleared by March 2023.2 
The vast mine/ERW contamination poses an immediate risk 
to personal safety in Afghanistan. In 2014 alone, there were 
1,296 recorded mine/ERW casualties (575 killed/721 injured), 
of which more than 98% are civilian” were civilians.3 In total, 
there have been 24,300 recorded casualties (4,802 killed/19,498 
injured) between 1979 and 2014.4 Access to the scarce victim 
assistance services in Afghanistan is severely hindered by poor 
infrastructure, continued conflict and poverty.5
The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) has 
surveyed and cleared almost 80 percent of all known mine/
ERW contamination throughout the country. MAPA’s main 
functions are coordinating, planning and setting priorities, 
information management, mobilizing resources, and ensur-
ing quality of mine action services, advocacy and communica-
tion. The Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC), 
which works under the Afghanistan National Disaster Man-
agement Authority, partners and coordinates with the Unit-
ed Nations Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (UNMACA) 
under the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). 
The National Mine Action Strategic Plan (NMASP) workshop, 18 October 2015.
All photos courtesy of UNMACA.
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There are approximately 50 mine action nongovernmental or-
ganizations (NGO) and commercial demining companies im-
plementing mine action projects in Afghanistan.
Based on the March 2016 UNMACA report, there are still 617 
sq km (235.9 sq mi) of residual contamination left to be cleared 
excluding the firing-range contamination.6 Figure 1 shows the 
scope of the current contamination levels in the country.
Need for a Strategic Plan
UNMACA developed the first MAPA strategic plan for 
2008–2013, as well as a document titled “Mine Action in 
Afghanistan: The Way Ahead,” which was released in May 
2006, outlining mine action end goals for Afghanistan and a 
plan for transitioning the mine action program to the Afghan 
government.2,3,7 These strategic plans were developed by only 
a few experts and were not properly communicated to various 
stakeholders, thus reducing the plans’ effectiveness. Since 2013, 
the APMBC extension work plan is the only available strategic 
plan. This document mainly focuses on the survey and clear-
ance of mines and ERW, while other aspects of mine action 
(i.e., facilitating development, gender mainstreaming, mine/
ERW risk education, advocacy and victim assistance) are not 
covered. Hence, stakeholders needed a comprehensive strategic 
Figure 1. Contamination status of districts in Afghanistan as of 31 March 2016.
Figure courtesy of UNMACA.
plan covering all aspects of mine action that could steer the 
program and coordinate activities among its stakeholders to 
achieve the program’s end goals.
NMASP Development Process
Two workshops were conducted in October 2015 and be-
tween January and February 2016 in Kabul, where par-
ticipants representing DMAC, UNMACA, implementing 
partners, relevant government ministries and some donors 
attended. Participants in the workshop reviewed the pro-
gram’s vision and mission statements, conducted SWOT and 
PESTLE analyses, and determined strategic risks and mitigat-
ing factors of the program.8,9 At the early stages of delibera-
tion, five strategic goals were determined:
1. Transition to national ownership
2. Facilitate development
3. Engage with other sectors
4. Implement the five pillars of mine action
5. Gender and diversity mainstreaming.
However, after further discussion among the manage-
ment of DMAC, UNMACA, UNMAS and the implementing 
partners, the first goal was deemed to already be in progress. 
Additionally, the stakeholders decided the fourth step on the 
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implementation of the five pillars of mine action would be 
divided into two parts to address both preventive functions 
(clearance, mine/ERW risk education, stockpile destruction 
and advocacy) and responsive functions (victim assistance 
and advocacy). The initial strategic goals were as follows:
1. Facilitate development
2. Engage with other sectors
3. Implement the five pillars of mine action 
3.1 Preventative functions to reduce impact of mines  
    and ERW 
3.2. Responsive functions to mitigate the consequences 
     of mine/ERW accidents
4. Gender and diversity mainstreaming.
In addition, five working groups were assigned and each 
group conducted a number of sessions to determine 33 objec-
tives and 108 action plans as well as indicators, milestones, 
potential risks and how to mitigate risks. During the second 
workshop, the working group outputs were reviewed and the 
statements for each goal were updated. The template and for-
mat of the National Mine Action Strategic Plan (NMASP) 
were discussed and participants determined that a follow-up 
session for governmental approval was necessary.
Strategic Goals and Objectives
Goal 1: Facilitating development. To establish and main-
tain confidence that all aspects of MAPA’s planning, prioriti-
zation, operations, monitoring and evaluation are informed by 
and assessed against the development requirements of the peo-
ple and government of Afghanistan. 
Objectives include:
• Identify development projects for the next five years, 
assess mine/ERW contamination of these project sites, 
mobilize resources and plan clearance operations from 
2016 to 2020
• Incorporate mine/ERW challenges into national prior-
ity programs and sustainable development goals as well 
as other government development frameworks
• Implement the mine action program as part of develop-
ment policies for projects and provincial strategic plans 
in key government ministries.
Goal 2: Engaging with other sectors. To ensure that 
ministries, departments and agencies of the government of 
Afghanistan, as well as national and international NGOs, and 
private sector stakeholders take into account the significance of 
MAPA’s strategies, priorities and activities.
Objectives include:
• Incorporating mine action into the following sectors: 
education, health, economic, private, agriculture, rural 
rehabilitation, social protection, security, infrastruc-
ture, and natural resources
• Drafting bilateral agreements with regional and inter-
national organizations on joint programming.
Goal 3.1: Preventive functions to reduce the impact of 
mines and ERW. To determine and implement appropriate 
and effective actions to reduce current and future impacts of 
mine and ERW contamination on Afghan people and govern-
ment through clearance, stockpile destruction, mine/ERW risk 
education and advocacy.
Objectives include:
• Enhance fundraising efforts to keep mine action 
activities on track
• Quantify hazards resulting from post-2001  
contamination
• Complete survey of remaining non-surveyed areas
• Keep the extension request plan on track
• Improve the capacity of the program to respond to new 
types of contamination
• Mainstream mine/ERW risk education into govern-
ment line ministries, community networks and civil so-
ciety organizations
• Support the government on destruction of unrecorded, 
sporadic, stockpiled and unserviceable ammunition 
• Reduce civilian casualties, especially the protection of 
children from mines and ERW
• Adopt and update policies and Afghan mine action 
standards/procedures in accordance with International 
Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
Goal 3.2: Responsive actions to mitigate the consequenc-
es of mine and ERW accidents. To determine and implement 
appropriate and effective actions to reduce the impacts aris-
ing from mine/ERW accidents on the people and government 
of Afghanistan.
Objectives include to advocate for and support
• The government of Afghanistan in developing national 
disability and victim assistance policies
• Relevant line ministries (Ministry of Labor, Social 
Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled [MoLSAMD], Ministry of 
Women’s Affairs [MoWA], and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs [MoFA], etc.) in developing disability and victim 
assistance inclusive policies and strategies
• MoLSAMD and other line ministries/institutions in 
conducting national disability and victim assistance 
surveys and development of a disability database
• The allocation of funds for direct services provision for 
disability and victim assistance activities.
Goal 4: Mainstreaming gender and diversity. To ensure 
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that all gender and diversity groups participate in and benefit 
from the work of MAPA and that MAPA benefits from the in-
sight and participation of gender and diverse groups in all as-
pects of its work.
Objectives include:
• Develop a MAPA gender and diversity policy
• Increase employment of women, people with disabilities 
and other marginalized groups
• Manage, design, implement and evaluate gender and 
diversity-sensitive projects
• Raise awareness within MAPA and its stakeholders of 
gender issues
• Improve consideration of gender and diversity issues 
in coordination mechanisms (building State capacity, 
problem-driven integrative adaptation, etc.)
• Establish a gender department and allocate a budget for 
gender-based activities
• Continue to build capacity of gender departments and 
promote their role in mainstreaming gender and diver-
sity policy.
The Way Ahead
This NMASP document was launched in early April 2016 
and a review committee was established to monitor and regu-
larly review the process of implementing the objectives while 
providing progress reports to UNMACA and DMAC.
Conclusion
Compared to the previous strategic plans, the preparation 
of these goals and objectives is more inclusive of a wider range 
of stakeholders. Participants agreed to all goals and objectives 
in the NMASP. Additionally, the plan incorporates the pillars 
of mine action and is concurrent with the Maputo Action Plan 
2014. 
See endnotes page 65
The end of the first workshop, 22 October 2015.
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The UXO Sector in Laos 
by Titus Peachey [ Mennonite Central Committee ]
Nearly fifty years after the nine-year Secret War (1964–1973), Laos is the scene of a US$35–$40 million annual enterprise, employing more than 3,000 
workers who, with assistance from governments and non-
governmental organizations (NGO) around the world, are 
engaged in unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance, victim 
assistance and mine risk education (MRE).1 The 2.2 million 
tons of bombs included an estimated 270 million cluster 
munitions, many of which failed to detonate on impact and 
created a lethal landscape to which villagers returned after 
the war. The inevitable post-war casualties now number more 
than 20,000.2 A high percentage of victims over the past 
several decades were not alive when the bombs fell.2
In light of these statistics, many have declared that the task 
of clearing ordnance in Laos will take a century or more. In 
the early 1980s, there were no surveys or clearance operations, 
only bombs and a steady stream of sad stories. Today, the de-
bate has shifted to the state of progress 
and the eventual end game. What indi-
cators should be used: the number of 
hectares cleared? The amount of ord-
nance destroyed? The number of casu-
alties? Or should the focus be on the 
number of UXO incident survivors still 
needing rehabilitative care? What about 
the number of economic development 
and poverty reduction initiatives that 
can move forward? And finally, when 
can the task be declared complete?
Recent developments within the 
UXO sector offer some help in answer-
ing these questions. While no one be-
lieves that every last piece of UXO in 
Laos will be destroyed, there is a grow-
ing sense of optimism that the next 
10–20 years of quality work will sig-
nificantly improve the safety of Lao 
villagers. Through coordinated planning, hard work and per-
sistence, important pieces are finally falling into place.
Administration 
The National Regulatory Authority (NRA), active since 
2006, is responsible for the oversight of the UXO sector in 
Laos, including policy, coordination, standards and quality 
management. It is chaired by the deputy prime minister and 
includes representatives from 17 different government minis-
tries, and the United Nations Development Program and U.S. 
State Department provide technical advisors.3 A UXO Sector 
Working Group chaired by the NRA meets regularly to review 
progress and establish annual goals. In 2010, UXO clearance 
was established as the ninth Millennium Development Goal. 
While not all of the plans on paper have been integrated into 
action on the ground, this coordination at the national level is 
having a positive effect overall.
A villager hoes her garden in Phonsavan, Laos, a dangerous activity in a land littered 
with unexploded ordnance (1984).
Photo courtesy of Mennonite Central Committee/Linda Gehman Peachey.
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Clearance
UXO clearance in Laos is managed by UXO Lao, the na-
tional enterprise, along with international humanitarian 
clearance operators including APOPO, The HALO Trust, 
Handicap International (HI), MAG (Mines Advisory Group), 
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and numerous commercial 
operators. Clearance teams in Laos routinely destroy between 
60,000 and 100,000 pieces of ordnance a year, with numbers 
rising in recent years.4 
Over the past several years, a debate within the UXO sec-
tor was sparked by clearance operations on land that had very 
little ordnance, leading to impressive reports on the number 
of hectares cleared albeit with little impact on reducing the 
actual threat to Lao villagers. To overcome this problem, all 
clearance operators have now adopted the evidence-based 
survey method to identify areas where clearance is needed.5 
This method relies initially on evidence such as strike data, 
incident reports and roving team data to help determine areas 
that are highly contaminated. Identified areas are then me-
thodically checked for UXO via a technical survey to deter-
mine if full-scale clearance operations should proceed.
The evidence-based survey method is already providing 
planners with more detailed information and allows clear-
ance teams to concentrate their efforts on highly contami-
nated land. The results during the first 10 months of 2015 are 
highly encouraging, showing more than double the amount of 
UXO destroyed per hectare when clearance efforts follow the 
evidence-based survey.6 Planners are using the survey results 
to create a database of confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) that 
can be prioritized for clearance. In 2016, an additional grant 
from the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the 
U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs 
(PM/WRA) is allowing the survey to move forward without 
pulling resources away from ongoing clearance operations. 
According to the NRA, the evidence-based survey should be 
completed in three of the nine most contaminated provinces 
in 2016, with the remaining six most contaminated provinces 
targeted for completion by 2020.7 
In a recent presentation to a UXO Sector Working 
Group Meeting, NRA Director General Mr. Phoukhieo 
Chanthasomboune noted that there are already 3,000 CHAs 
awaiting clearance, amounting to three-to-four years of 
work.8 This is in stark contrast to the early days of clearance. 
When MAG deminers first began working in Xieng Khouang 
Province in 1994, they were confronted with vast areas of 
UXO-contaminated land that defied definition. As clear-
ance operations began, the deminers created small islands 
of cleared land in the midst of fields, villages and hillsides 
that were still littered with varying levels of UXO.9 For years, 
clearance teams kept detailed records of areas cleared and the 
amount of UXO destroyed, yet they were without a clear pic-
ture of the size of the total task. To now be able to clearly de-
fine specific areas of highly contaminated land throughout 
the country and prioritize them for clearance is a big step to-
ward creating a realistic assessment of the scale of the prob-
lem along with a timeline and budget for completing the task.
Still to be factored into the survey and clearance tasks 
ahead are the provinces with lower levels of contamination 
such as Phongsaly, Oudomsai and Bolikhamxai, where le-
thal ordnance still threatens villagers and hampers economic 
development. Just one piece of UXO in a garden are enough 
to create a risk, and a child killed while digging up bamboo 
shoots is a loss that can traumatize an entire village. The grow-
ing optimism present among planners who see real progress 
in the big picture is likely not felt in these areas where help is 
yet to arrive.
A European Union report highlights the dynamic of pop-
ulation movements as another complicating factor in mak-
ing land safe for Lao villagers.10 Population growth along with 
economic development initiatives such as mining, hydro- 
power and forestry sometimes result in people moving into ar-
eas that include highly contaminated land. These factors make 
it imperative that economic development and poverty reduc-
tion initiatives be coordinated with UXO clearance at all levels 
so that villagers can earn their livelihood in safety.
Year
Submunitions via 
Battle Area 
Clearance
Submunitions via 
Roving Team
Other UXO via 
Battle Area 
Clearance
Other UXO via 
Roving Team Total
2014 27,048 31,450 17,699 16,743 92,940
2013 24,320 15,967 22,127 19,073 81,487
2012 29,662 14,164 22,978 13,162 79,966
2011 19,431 13,359 16,981 13,051 62,822
2010 21,031 14,417 15,772 18,376 69,596
Figure 1. Number of submunitions and other UXO destroyed in Laos, 2010–2014. Information sourced from the 
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, 2011–2015.
Figure courtesy of the author.
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Victim Assistance 
One of the more important progress indicators for the UXO 
sector is the number of UXO casualties. Thankfully, as shown 
in Figure 2, the number of new victims has decreased signifi-
cantly over the past years.4 
This decline in casualties can be attributed to several fac-
tors. Clearance removes lethal ordnance from the land and re-
duces the number of potential encounters that villagers may 
have with UXO. In addition, MRE helps children recognize 
UXO and understand the dangers it poses. Risk education was 
formally included in the national school curriculum in 2014, 
although the production of resources is still limited.6 Villagers 
also know that when they find ordnance on the surface, they 
can call a roving team to safely destroy it. 
While the number of new casualties has clearly dropped, 
the estimated number of survivors of UXO incidents that still 
live in the country was 15,000 in 2012.4 Many of these survi-
vors will need medical, rehabilitative and/or psychosocial ser-
vices over the course of their entire lifetime. 
Through funding from PM/WRA, World Education, Inc. 
provides comprehensive case management for UXO incident 
survivors in Xieng Khouang Province via a Victim Assistance 
Support Team (VAST). In addition, all UXO survivors in 
Laos are eligible to have transportation and medical costs re-
imbursed through their war victim’s medical fund. Once in-
formed, VAST members visit UXO incident survivors and 
their family members in the hospital. The fund covers per di-
ems for family members to stay with survivors while in the 
hospital and covers the cost of initial and ongoing care and 
treatment. Support is also available for much needed home 
renovations to better accommodate the survivor. 
There are challenges, however. Villagers cannot access the 
fund if the medical system does not communicate the need, 
and survivors in rural areas face very difficult transportation 
obstacles. In these situations, survivors do not always receive 
the care they need.
The same reality is true for survivors needing artificial 
limbs and other rehabilitative services. The Cooperative 
Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE) works with the 
Lao Ministry of Health Center for Medical Rehabilitation 
to increase access to quality prosthetic and orthotic ser-
vices in Laos. COPE receives funding from the Leahy War 
Victims Fund administered by the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID), as well as fund-
ing from the governments of Australia, Canada and Norway, 
and from private donors, both institutional and individu-
al. Five rehabilitation centers are located in Luang Prabang, 
Xieng Khouang, Savannakhet, Champassack and Vientiane 
Provinces. Accommodation at these centers is provided by the 
Lao government while COPE reimburses survivors for trans-
portation costs and a family caregiver; however, Laos’ rugged 
terrain and poor transportation infrastructure are formidable 
barriers to overcome.
In response, COPE established an outreach program (COPE 
Connect) in 14 provinces, forming a network of 700 health of-
ficials at provincial and district levels to assist with clinical 
field trips to assess the need for prosthetic and orthotic de-
vices. In addition, via funding from the U.S. and Canadian 
governments, COPE hopes to begin a three-year program of 
mobile clinics in 2017. Of the approximately 500 patients who 
received prostheses via COPE’s services, more than a third 
were UXO survivors.11
Through support from France, the Netherlands, Norway 
and the European Union, HI administers a comprehensive 
UXO threat reduction project that includes survey, clear-
ance, risk education and victim assistance. In Savannakhet 
Province, HI’s victim assistance work supports people with 
disabilities from all causes, including UXO accidents. Support 
includes livelihood training and coaching, disability rights 
and equality training, along with help in overcoming barri-
ers to necessary medical and rehabilitation services. HI’s work 
with victims is beginning to focus more on entire communi-
ties made vulnerable by UXO as well as on the economic and 
social integration of these communities into the broader soci-
ety. HI supports the development of a national disability pol-
icy that is inclusive of UXO survivors’ needs by working with 
the National Committee for Disabled People and Elderly and 
the National Regulatory Authority.
Another area of significant need is the issue of psycho-
logical trauma, but Laos is not yet sufficiently equipped with 
trained personnel for this area. A level of psychosocial and 
Year # of Casualties
2015 (First 10 months) 38
2014 45
2013 42
2012 56
2011 99
2010 117
2009 134
2008 310
Figure 2. UXO casualties in Laos, 2008–2015. 
Information sourced from the Landmine and 
Cluster Munition Monitor, 2011–2015.
Figure courtesy of the author.
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peer support is provided by the World Education, Inc. in 
Xieng Khouang Province. The Quality of Life Association, 
a Lao NGO, helps by providing skills training for survivors 
who need to adjust their means of livelihood. In addition, so-
cial stigma is often associated with disabilities, which is an is-
sue that HI addresses through its victim assistance work in 
Savannakhet Province. This requires broader work within 
family systems and the general public to create a supportive 
and encouraging environment so that everyone can thrive, re-
gardless of physical limitation. 
The NRA initiated a Survivor Tracking System designed to 
provide an ongoing survey of all survivors’ needs. By the end 
of 2014, data from 10 provinces was entered into the database. 
Furthermore, the NRA adopted a new Victim Assistance 
Strategic Plan in 2014, addressing the comprehensive needs 
of survivors, but implementation of the plan is lagging, par-
ticularly at the local levels due to a number of reasons includ-
ing a lack of trained personnel and proper equipment, difficult 
transportation and poor communications infrastructure. 
Funding and Political Relations
In the early years of the UXO sector in Laos, the effort was 
determined and innovative yet bore no connection to the 
scale of the problem. Initiated in 1994 with private funding 
from the Mennonite Central Committee, 
the work quickly gained the attention of 
governments and other larger donors. 
However, funding was cautious and ca-
pacity was small. By 2000, funding from 
governments totaled only US$6.6 mil-
lion. The United States was the highest 
funder that year, contributing almost 
$1.5 million dollars.12
Funding for clearance in Laos began 
to rise sharply in 2010, and in 2014, there 
were contributions from 13 different na-
tions plus the European Union. Japan, 
a non-belligerent in the war has been a 
major funder. Since 2010, the U.S. contri-
butions have more than tripled and now 
make up nearly half of the total.4
PM/WRA supported the work of 
the following implementing partners 
in FY 2014: Catholic Relief Services, 
The HALO Trust, Health Leadership 
International, MAG, NPA, Spirit of 
Soccer, Sterling Global and World 
Education, Inc.13 USAID’s Leahy War 
Victims Fund provided funding to the Cooperative Orthotic 
Prosthetic Enterprise. 
Funding increases from the United States are attributed to 
several factors: 
• Concentrated education and advocacy initiated by 
Legacies of War, especially among members of the Lao 
diaspora in the United States. A speaker’s tour planned 
by Legacies of War and funded by PM/WRA brought 
a Lao UXO survivor and a deminer to 12 U.S. cities in 
2013. Repeated contacts with congressional champions, 
letters from former U.S. ambassadors to Laos and the 
dedication of congressional and State Department staff 
resulted in a growing commitment to complete the task 
in Laos.
• Warming political relations between Laos and the 
United States were also important. Then Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton visited Laos in 2012 and met 
a UXO survivor while touring the COPE Center in 
Vientiane. Deputy National Security Director for 
Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes visited Laos in 
2015, as did Secretary of State John Kerry in January 
2016. Laos’ chairmanship of ASEAN (Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations) brought the Lao Prime 
Minister to the United States for an ASEAN Summit 
The author and Bua la, National Bomb Removal Project Director, survey unexploded 
cluster munitions in a pasture near Phonsavan, Laos (1994). 
Photo courtesy of Mennonite Central Committee/Titus Peachey.
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Meeting in February 2016, and President Obama will 
visit Laos during the ASEAN meetings in September 
2016. 
• Appropriations language in the U.S. Congress gives pri-
ority to clearance operations in areas where the ord-
nance is of U.S. origin. In a visit to Laos in October 
2015, Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes re-
marked, “The U.S. created this problem. We have a mor-
al responsibility to help clean it up.”14 
Conclusion
For Laos, the next two decades are critical. Will this new 
survey methodology and clearance operations extend to all 
the affected provinces? As the true scale of the problem be-
comes clear, will funding remain strong? Will comprehensive 
care for UXO victims and their communities be integrated 
into a national strategy for all who struggle with disabilities? 
On the cusp of so much promise, it is essential that the com-
mitment on the part of donors does not waver and that the 
United States continues to be the leading donor. The capacity 
and technical expertise are in place. The opportunity to re-
solve this legacy of war has never been clearer. 
See endnotes page 65
A cluster bomblet lodged in the dike of a rice paddy in Nanou village, Laos (2005). 
Photo courtesy of Mennonite Central Committee/Titus Peachey.
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Field Notes
According to the Small Arms Survey, around 526,000 persons are killed every year as a result of armed vio-lence, and many more sustain injuries requiring medi-
cal and rehabilitative care that severely impacts their lives.1 In 
West Africa, the propagation of small arms and light weapons 
(SA/LW) escalates armed conflicts and 
affects the security and the stability of 
the entire Sahel region.
In Mali, the proliferation of SA/LW 
leads to numerous incidents, mainly 
caused by intra- and inter-community 
violence and poor gun-storage practices 
at the household level.2 In order to reduce 
these risks, the United Nations Mine 
Action Service (UNMAS) launched a 
pilot project, which was implemented 
by DanChurchAid (DCA) from March 
2014 to July 2015. The project aimed 
to improve the security situation and 
reduce tensions within and between 
communities in the region of Mopti 
(central Mali), which is affected by 
armed violence. It used a community-
based approach to ensure ownership of 
the project by the community.
SA/LW Survey
A survey was first conducted in the Mopti region with the 
following objectives:
* Report on the number of SA/LW stored in homes within 
the Mopti and Douentza districts
* Conduct a needs assessment and inform the subsequent 
strategy for armed violence reduction (AVR) and SA/
LW awareness through a thorough analysis of the scope 
and nature of the problems and their underlying causes. 
Establish a baseline for evidence-based impact moni-
toring of the activities in order to develop community-
owned safety strategies and improve risk awareness.
The survey found that 17 percent of people consulted admit-
ted to owning firearms. “Self-protection” figured highly in both 
self-reported and perceived reasons for firearms possession. 
The survey shows that an estimated 10 percent of the popula-
tion was victim to armed violence in 2013. Participants iden-
tified road robberies, house burglaries 
and conflict between farmers and pasto-
ralists as the three most significant con-
cerns related to armed violence.
Attitudes toward disarmament were 
generally positive, although 50 percent 
of the respondents said that disarma-
ment did not concern them or did not 
apply. While young males were most of-
ten identified as perpetrators of armed 
violence, women and youth were less in 
favor of disarmament than their elders 
(both men and women).
Community Safety Planning
After analyzing the results of this 
survey, the community safety planning 
(CSP) methodology was used to define 
activities and implement safer commu-
nity action plans. By first selecting a 
community safety committee, the CSP 
method empowers communities to de-
velop plans that they can implement themselves.3 This capacity- 
building approach to AVR programming consists of concrete 
activities aimed at empowering and improving the resilience 
of local populations in order to anticipate, analyze, prevent 
and manage threats to their security, as well as to respond to 
incidences of armed violence and conflict. The CSP method is 
participatory and places communities in control of all phases 
of the project cycle, from the initial assessments to the final 
evaluations. The results of the needs assessment identified a 
higher prevalence of armed violence in some areas than oth-
ers, thus the project focused on the municipalities of Konna 
Armed Violence Reduction in Central 
Mali: A Community-based Approach
by Sonia Pezier [ UNMAS ] and Jean-Denis Larsen [ DanChurchAid ]
A concert banner.
Photo courtesy of UNMAS.
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and Boroundougou (Mopti district), and Gandamia and 
Deberé (Douentza district).
Operational Achievements
The delivery of SA/LW risk education sessions was one of 
the project’s cornerstones. The sessions promoted safe be-
haviors for at-risk groups and firearm owners. The project 
reached a total of 13,930 people (35 percent women and girls) 
in 20 villages and distributed 11,446 awareness leaflets. Both 
before and after the sessions, a sample of the beneficiaries re-
ceived questionnaires to measure whether their knowledge 
and awareness toward SA/LW issues had increased. 
Moussa Fofana, the village chief of Takoutal, remarked 
that the AVR project “has brought about many changes in 
the villages, one among all is the fact that children are no 
longer tempted to play with SA/LW and their ammunition: 
when they see something suspicious they go and inform 
their parents.”
In parallel, DCA distributed 120 wooden gun boxes to ben-
eficiaries who legally possess a firearm, thus encouraging 
people to better secure their weapons, and thereby reducing 
accidents and loss of life. Each box contained a copy of Law 
N. 04-050 concerning firearms and ammunition ownership 
in Mali and an instruction leaflet on how to use the gun box. 
Under the heading of Jeunesse et musique face aux armes lé-
gères (Youth and Music Against Small Arms), DCA aimed to 
empower youth to advocate for dialogue while raising aware-
ness of the dangers and risks associated with SA/LW in an ef-
fort to discourage youth from arming themselves. A concert 
organized in December 2014 gathered more than 1,000 peo-
ple; the national TV channel ORTM and local radio stations 
in Mopti and Douentza districts covered the event.
Another important component of the project was the cre-
ation or re-establishment of peace and mediation commit-
tees as well as surveillance committees. Peace and mediation 
committees are generally composed of religious leaders, tra-
ditional leaders such as the forgerons and griots, village chiefs 
and other influential community members. These committees 
handle family disputes and intra- and inter-community argu-
ments, and therefore play a key role in promoting peace and 
forgiveness among the parties. The surveillance committees 
provide protection to the village through an early warning 
system mechanism, which includes reporting anything suspi-
cious to the village chiefs and ensuring that unattended ani-
mals are not damaging the crops. These activities address the 
needs identified by the communities for a sustainable mecha-
nism to settle conflicts.
Impact of the Project
At the end of the project, the AVR teams conducted an im-
pact assessment in 20 target villages, which shows a three-
fold impact.
Firstly, all participants recognized that the project signifi-
cantly contributed to a reported decrease in security incidents 
and conflicts between communities. The target population no-
ticed that relations and social cohesion between different so-
cial groups improved due to better dialogue and cooperation 
between the communities. The establishment of peace and 
mediation and surveillance committees helps the population 
to feel safer and has provided a means through which to share 
concerns. Conflicts are now managed at the village level, with 
security as the common goal. Moreover, the reduction of ten-
sions and security incidents facilitated the movement of peo-
ple and goods. 
An awareness leaflet.
Photo courtesy of UNMAS.
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Awareness activities changed how people behave in regards 
to handling and storing SA/LW, and has helped to decrease 
the number of SA/LW accidents. The distribution of gun boxes 
helped increase safe weapons storage practices; the beneficiary 
communities are now aware of the Malian laws regulating SA/
LW possession.
Moreover, the CSP methodology enabled a high level of lo-
cal ownership of the project, which has empowered commu-
nities to take action and improve their own security through 
enhanced conflict management practices at the village level. 
The participatory approach and the involvement of women 
in the committees have also impacted gender perceptions. 
The Safer Community Committee members are now practic-
ing their newfound skills in mediation, advocacy and SA/LW 
risk education.
Conclusion 
Mali is facing several challenges linked to armed conflict, 
terrorist activities and intra-community violence. Armed vi-
olence reduction activities are a key enabler of stabilization 
and development efforts, especially in the central and north-
ern regions of Mali. In line with the implementation priorities 
of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali signed 
in June 2015, such a project should be considered good prac-
tice for restoring social cohesion amongst communities as it 
complements peace education and effective security and jus-
tice mechanisms. 
See endnotes page 66
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The 20 young artists before the concert.
Photo courtesy of DCA.
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Explosive Remnants of War:  
A Deadly Threat to Refugees  
by Dr. Ken Rutherford and Andrew Cooney [ Center for International Stabilization and Recovery ]
The deadly legacy of explosive remnants of war (ERW), including landmines, improvised ex-plosive devices (IED) and unexploded ordnance 
(UXO) is increasingly a threat to refugee populations, eco-
nomic migrants and internally displaced persons (IDP) in 
countries throughout Africa, Europe, the Middle East and 
Southeast Asia.1 
By the end of 2014, the implications of persecution, con-
flict and other factors forcibly displaced approximately 59.5 
million people worldwide. This number is comprised of 19.5 
million refugees and roughly 38 million IDPs.2 Refugees from 
the Middle East are at extreme risk since they primarily travel 
across the Balkans, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Syria, 
and Turkey, which have mines planted along their borders 
and UXO from previous conflicts scattered throughout their 
territory. In this case, ironically, instead of being a threat to 
ambulatory refugee populations, mines can be the original 
cause for the displacement of civilians in their own countries. 
The use of mines, IEDs and UXO in highly populated areas 
and along transportation routes occasionally forces people to 
flee due to fear of injury or death, positioning ERW as a major 
determinant of civilian displacement. This was demonstrated 
recently in Libya, when roughly 60,000 people fled from an 
uprising and were subsequently delayed in their return as a 
result of ERW contamination in residential areas.3 These myr-
iad effects of mines both as causes of migration and impedi-
ments to migration is displayed in Table 1.
Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria are three of the most landmine-
contaminated countries in the world. Refugees, IDPs and mi-
grants who cross through these states are at a tremendous risk 
for both injury and death. The armed forces under former Iraq 
President Saddam Hussein planted hundreds of thousands of 
mines near the Iran-Iraq border during the Iran–Iraq War 
(1980–1988), and many still threaten refugee populations.4 
According to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
(ICBL), anti-personnel (AP) mines were used in recent con-
flicts, such as by the Gaddafi regime in Libya and Syria.5 The 
HALO Trust estimates that Afghanistan “is one of the most 
mined countries in the world with estimates of up to 640,000 
landmines laid since 1979” and that “[m]ore than three de-
cades of conflict have also left the country littered with unex-
ploded ordnance (UXO).”6 
In the Middle East, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 
has altered the humanitarian mine action landscape, increas-
ing the threat of injury and death through the use of explosive 
devices such as mines, booby traps and IEDs. Formerly un-
der ISIS command, Jurf Al-Sakhar, a town roughly 60 miles 
southwest of Baghdad, was found to have around 3,000 mines 
Refugees IDPs Asylum seekers in EU  in the 4th Q of 2015
Turkey 1,587,374
Afghanistan 300,423 805,409 79,300
Iraq 271,143 3,596,356 53,600
South Sudan 248,152 1,645,392
Syria 149,140 7,632,500 145,100
Table 1. Per U.N. Commissioner for Refugees and the European Commission, 
3 March 2016. http://bit.ly/1XaQQ2F.
Courtesy of Eurostat Statistics Explained.
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when the Iraq army reclaimed the territory.7 ISIS also proves 
to be a formidable enemy and danger to refugees in the Middle 
East because of their ability to adapt and reinvent these ex-
plosive devices. Moreover, the transnational insurgency group 
is committed to deploying vast amounts of nuisance mines, 
which are harder to locate, mark and clear as they are not de-
ployed for military tactical purposes but are laid haphazardly 
and at random.8 ISIS leverages its advantage of territory, facili-
ties, financing and technical knowledge to adapt.9 According 
to the Kurdish fighters who battle ISIS, the group left thou-
sands of mines in their wake as they fled the Syrian city of 
Hasakah. There are so many mines, in fact, that at least 15 
villages around Hasakah are uninhabitable; Kurdish fight-
ers simply do not have the technology or skills to conduct 
mine clearance. A commander in the army stated that 15 of 
his fighters were killed in the last four months while attempt-
ing to defuse mines.10 Additionally, Iraqi forces took the city 
of Anbar back from ISIS control in December 2015. However, 
ISIS “used ‘improvised explosive devices’ to booby trap roads, 
buildings, pylons, bridges and river banks, and placed snip-
ers in high positions as it seeks to hamper the progress of its 
enemies in Ramadi.”11 Since December 2015 and as a result of 
these tactics, roughly 20 civilians were killed and many oth-
ers injured by IEDs while trying to flee. Looking at Iraq as 
a whole, there are currently 3.3 million IDPs in 3,500 sites 
across the country, according to statistics issued by the U.N. 
mission in Iraq in March 2016.11
Fighting not involving ISIS continues to occur throughout 
Iraq but especially around the city of Ramadi. According to 
Iraq’s Ministry of Displacement and Migration, thousands 
of Iraqi citizens fled from the fighting between the army and 
Daesh militants around the city. The Iraqi army previously re-
claimed the city from Daesh militants in December 2015, and 
the government is clearing the city of UXO before IDPs can 
safely return.12 
These obstacles demonstrate the critical danger citizens 
face even after they return home. According to MAG (Mines 
Advisory Group), approximately 110,000 Syrian refugees have 
fled to Iraq. The majority live near the Domiz Refugee camp, 
which is located next to a former military base and is heav-
ily contaminated with mines and UXO.13 Since the late 1980s, 
mines have victimized more than 29,000 people across Iraq, 
with more than 14,000 of those casualties occurring in the 
Kurdistan region. This is an immediate issue, as the major-
ity of refugees are currently living in this region.14 In addi-
tion, minefields remain along the borders of Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria and Turkey, as well as along the internal former 
Green Line separating the Kurdistan region from central and 
Domiz camp in Dohuk, Iraqi Kurdistan, is the temporary home to more than 16,000 Kurdish Syrians.
Photo courtesy of IRIN.
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southern Iraq. As a result of the massive amount of mines, ref-
ugee movement in Iraq is heavily restricted. Table 2 lists coun-
tries with more than 100 reported ERW casualties in 2014.
The Middle East
Since the Syrian Civil War began, people in increasing 
numbers have fled the country for Europe and North America 
in search of a better quality of life. To date, at least 1.6 million 
Syrians have sought refuge in Turkey, and the Turkish gov-
ernment has already spent nearly US$4 billion in response. 
Their path across the border into Turkey is littered with UXO, 
greatly increasing risk of injury or death. Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) reports that Turkey laid almost 615,500 mines 
along its border with Syria to prevent illegal border crossings 
between 1957 and 1998. HRW states that a restricted zone 
along the Turkey-Syria border threatens thousands of Syrian 
refugees with a high number of mines.15 Despite the Turkish 
General Assembly passing a bill in February 2015 to clear the 
majority of those mines, refugees continue to be killed and 
injured as they try to escape from Syria.16 A renewed effort by 
the Turkish government may make a huge difference in pro-
curing safety for migrants fleeing Syria. According to Turkish 
Defense Minister Ismet Yilmaz, more than 222,000 mines will 
be cleared, and the country aims to conclude clearance opera-
tions by 2022.17 Civilians are not the only ones who are at seri-
ous risk from mines. According to ARA News from 16 March 
2016, at least five Kurdish YPG (People’s Protection Units) 
fighters were killed and 20 or more wounded in a mine explo-
sion planted by ISIS prior to their departure from Shaddadi 
city in Syria’s northeastern Hasakah province.18
The current number of Syrian refugees is simply stagger-
ing. According to the UNHCR, there are 4,813,993 registered 
Syrian refugees as of 16 March 2016, with 2.1 million residing 
in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. Another 1.9 million ref-
ugees are in Turkey and more than 28,000 in North Africa. 
The refugees are 49.3 percent male, 50.7 percent female, with 
the largest demographic being those between the ages of 18 
(21.5 percent) and 59 (24 percent). Between April 2011 and 
January 2016, there have been 935,008 Syrian asylum appli-
cations in Europe.19
Despite having an economy that comprises less than 0.001 
percent of the U.S. and E.U. economies, Jordan has accepted 
at least 60 times the number of Syrian refugees as France and 
250 times the number of refugees as Italy. Based on the latest 
figures from the UNHCR, there are 630,000 Syrian refugees 
registered in Jordan.19 With so many migrants and refugees, 
Jordan is having an extremely difficult time keeping up with 
the increasing numbers. According to Amnesty International, 
58 percent of Syrians in Jordan who have chronic health con-
ditions lack access to medications or other health services.20 
This is a serious issue because these refugees rely heavily on 
the health services provided by Jordan. Lebanon, too, is bear-
ing the brunt of the protracted violence in Syria. According to 
Al Arabiya, the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is more 
than a quarter of the country’s own population, and Lebanon 
is hosting at least 1.2 million refugees.21
IDPs and refugees are concurrently vulnerable to landmine 
devastation. Presently the 7,632,500 IDPs in Syria are threat-
ened by mines and UXO. Furthermore, roughly 6.5 million 
of those IDPs are in need of serious humanitarian assistance 
in the wake of the ongoing conflict according to the United 
Nations.22 In 2012, Syrian troops reportedly planted mines 
along routes used by IDPs trying to flee the country.23 ISIS 
has similarly added to the danger by leaving mines and UXO in 
Christian civilian homes. As a result, civilians returning to their 
homes are faced with underground devices that can be triggered 
by something as simple as a bicycle or a child’s footsteps.24
Europe 
Even after reaching Europe, refugee populations are not safe 
from the devastating effects of mines. Croatia and Hungary 
recently closed their borders to refugees, forcing them to fol-
low a new path from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Montenegro. Left over from the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has 1,417 minefields across 1,165 ki-
lometers of territory.25 The flooding that plagued the country 
in 2014 is another issue compounding the country’s mine con-
tamination. Many mines have shifted to new areas, calling for 
emergency marking in many of the flooded areas.26 Prior to 
the border closing, the majority of refugees could safely cross 
through Hungary on the way to their final destination, most 
Country Number of casualties
Afghanistan 1,296
Colombia 286
Myanmar 251
Pakistan 233
Syria 174
Cambodia 154
Mali 144
Table 2. Bolded countries ratified the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
Convention, per the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, 
November 2015. http://bit.ly/24AqYwL.
Table courtesy of the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.
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often Germany or a Scandinavian country. Like Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia is rife with mines and UXO. There are 
an estimated 50,000 mines in the ground, and 198 people have 
died in Croatia from UXO since 1996.27 Mines are dispersed 
across 10 counties and contaminate at least 77 towns and mu-
nicipalities. Greece is a popular entry point for Middle Eastern 
and African refugees, and faces many of the same problems as 
Croatia. Despite reporting in 2011 that it cleared UXO from 
large amounts of land, a military official noted that residual 
contamination could still exist in multiple other areas of the 
country.27 The Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor re-
ports that a majority of these existing mines date back to the 
Greek civil war (1947–1949). Similar to Turkey, mines plant-
ed at least 50 years ago still pose a threat and cause long-term 
damage to refugee populations.28 In 2016, Greece has seen 
149,208 arrivals by sea according to the UNHCR. Additionally, 
The Za’atari refugee camp for Syrians in Jordan, November 2013. 
Photo courtesy of CISR.
91 percent of those come from countries 
where refugees are extremely preva-
lent.29 Even after reaching their final 
destination, mine victims face great ob-
stacles and challenges that limit their 
ability to thrive. In many cases, refugee 
mine survivors lack official recognition 
as refugees, mine victims or war vic-
tims, and do not achieve citizenship sta-
tus. Displaced persons with disabilities 
routinely face insufficient and unequal 
access to housing, education, health-
care and rehabilitation within the refu-
gee camps.30
Africa
South Sudan is heavily mined, which 
threatens the respective IDP popu-
lation. The Southern Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudan 
national army planted the vast major-
ity of the mines and UXO during a 21-
year civil war that ended in 2005 with 
the signing of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement. The most contaminat-
ed areas include the States of Central 
Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Upper 
Nile, and Jonglei. Currently, there are 
225,286 South Sudanese refugees in 
Ethiopia, many of whom had to cross 
these states to secure safety. Thirty-four 
percent of casualties from mines oc-
curred in Upper Nile State, emphasizing the danger and risks 
refugees and IDPs take. The government of South Sudan im-
plemented a National Mine Action Strategic Plan, creating a 
decentralized and rapid explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
response capacity within the army and the police forces in or-
der to address residual mine and ERW contamination long 
term.31
Other African nations are also currently plagued by mines 
and their debilitating effects. Notably, Angola has a substan-
tial amount of mine contamination following its long civ-
il war (1975–2002). According to the Global Development 
Research Group, approximately 2.2 million citizens that 
live on 75 percent of the territory in Angola are threatened 
by UXO.32 Particularly hampered by UXO, the province of 
Moxico is one of the most contaminated and poorest regions, 
yet the area has seen 8,000 refugees return since 2014. This 
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group is at serious risk of injury or death from mines and can-
not safely farm their land; the effect on the country’s agricul-
ture is significant. For the most part, Angolan farmers can 
no longer produce coffee, sugarcane, cotton or bananas, forc-
ing the vast majority of the rural population to live below the 
poverty line.33 Despite the work of organizations such as The 
HALO Trust, which has destroyed more than 21,300 mines, 
thousands of Angolan residents have been killed or injured.34 
According to the United Nations, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (DRC) has roughly 120,000 refugees and over 
2 million IDPs, all of whom are threatened by the presence 
of mines.35 There are a substantial number of mines in the 
Kabalo territory, which was heavily mined during the civil 
war between 1998 and 2003. A 2011 Mine Action report notes 
that the large-scale movement of IDPs and refugees trying 
to return home are threatened by these mines.36 In 2014, 47 
people died from mines and there have been a total of 2,540 
mine victims in the DRC. There are at least 130 suspected haz-
ardous areas (SHA) and five are suspected to be impacted. At 
least 130 SHAs are affected by mines, and five areas are im-
pacted by submunitions.37 Somalia is equally littered with 
UXO. The eastern Somalia-Ethiopia border area is heavily 
contaminated with mines that were laid during the 1977 bor-
der war. According to the United Nations Mine Action Service 
(UNMAS), AP mines have caused only four percent of deaths 
and injuries in Somalia during 2011. In contrast, UXO repre-
sents 55 percent of casualties, thus highlighting the severity of 
the mine issue at present. Some of the effects of the mine pro-
liferation in Somalia are similar to those in Angola, most no-
tably a reduced availability for both livestock and agricultural 
production. Fortunately, according to the United Nations, the 
mine issue in Somalia could be resolved within a ten-year pe-
riod if given proper attention.38
Southeast Asia
Years of protracted violence in Southeast Asia has led to a 
landmine crisis that is currently being dealt with by both local 
governments and international agencies. Myanmar is partic-
ularly vulnerable. According to the Danish Refugee Council 
(DRC) and Danish Demining Group (DDG), in Kachin State, 
IDPs makeup nearly half of all mine casualties.39 In fact, 
there were 3,450 recorded civilian casualties in Myanmar be-
tween 1999 and 2013.40 Myanmar has a significant amount of 
IDPs resulting from more than 50 years of fighting between 
More than half of the refugees at Islahiya camp in southern Turkey are children and teenagers.
Photo courtesy of IRIN.
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ethnic non-state armed groups. By the end of 2013, there were 
640,900 IDPs based on U.N. agency figures.41 Many of the 
mines are located in Karen State where the Karen ethnic reb-
els have fought against the Myanmar government for over 50 
years. Due to lack of adequate healthcare, many mine survi-
vors travel across the Thailand border to receive treatment.42 
Sri Lanka is another nation facing landmine problems. The 
25-year civil war between the government and the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ended in 2009, displacing 
300,000 people. In addition, the conflict left the country’s 
northern and eastern districts heavily contaminated by UXO. 
This has prevented many IDPs from returning and rebuild-
ing their lives. As of 2012, more than 467,500 IDPs returned 
to the north and east; however, many are resettling beyond 
the areas that were cleared of mines, thus remaining in criti-
cal danger.43 Victim-activated IEDs pose a tremendous risk to 
refugees, IDPs, migrants and civilians.
Conclusion 
Regardless of the reasons for migration, IDP and refugee 
populations are at a heightened risk of injury or death from 
mines, IEDs and UXO for several reasons. First, the vast 
majority are civilians who are typically unaware of the life-
threatening dangers that mines, IEDs and UXO pose. Second, 
many of the refugees, IDPs and migrants cross unfamiliar ter-
ritory in order to reach their destinations. The terrain is often 
difficult, and mines may be strategically located in the areas 
most frequented by IDPs. As such, they do not know where 
mines were deployed, IEDs utilized, or the location of UXO 
blinds or stockpiles.44 
These populations are moving, which places them at a much 
greater risk than if they were sedentary. The movement of ref-
ugees, IDPs and migrants is currently occuring in war or con-
flict zones such as Afghanistan, Iraq, South Sudan and Syria. 
* Victim-activated IEDs caused almost two-thirds of all 
Afghan casualties in 2014.
* 809 IED casualties were reported in Afghanistan in 
2014 as compared to 557 IED casualties in 2013.
* Victim-activated IEDs, including homemade mines and 
booby-traps, were found throughout Kobani, Syria, in 
2015.
• At least 40 deaths and significantly more injuries 
caused by these mines were reported in the first 
quarter of 2015 in the villages surrounding Kobani.
* In 2015, IEDs were reported to be the leading cause of 
death among the 750 Kurdish Peshmerga forces in Iraq 
killed between June 2014 and January 2015.45
Until stability is achieved, the number of deaths due to UXO 
and mines will continue to rise. The armed conflicts are desta-
bilizing these countries and hindering the ability of govern-
ments and international humanitarian organizations to 
implement and execute plans for mine eradication effectively. 
With the help of international humanitarian law and interna-
tional human rights law, states have started to recognize and 
commit to addressing the needs of displaced persons as well as 
mine victims.46 Ensuring the future success of programs will 
require focused and cooperative dialogue among national gov-
ernments, in-country factions and outside organizations. 
See endnotes page 66
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Finding Legacy Minefields 
in the Jordan Valley
by Jamal Odibat [ Jordan’s National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation ]
Due to the many difficulties in accurately deter-mining the location of legacy minefields, dem-ining personnel need traditional and sometimes 
improvised methods for locating and verifying contami-
nation. With a unique combination of terrain, vegetation, 
water resources and soil types, the Jordan Valley requires 
specialized minefield survey and clearance methods to 
avoid harming the environment.
Regarded as the main source of Jordan’s food security, the 
Jordan Valley’s climate allows the country to export large 
amounts of fruit and vegetables year round, and has great 
potential for further agricultural and economic develop-
ment. However, the Royal Engineering Corps cleared an es-
timated 150,000 landmines between 1993 and 2008. In the 
past few years, most mine-related accidents in the region 
took place in areas that were previously believed to be free of 
mines or in areas adjacent to former minefields.1 After clear-
ance operations concluded in 2008, mines continued to kill 
or injure civilians, not only posing a serious risk to human 
security but also blocking millions of dollars’ worth of in-
vestments in the region. 
In August 2008, the National Committee for Demining and 
Rehabilitation (NCDR) assessed the clearance reports and con-
ducted local community impact surveys to determine whether 
mines might have shifted due to flooding or erosion and how 
this risk was impacting their livelihoods. Following the review 
of records of legacy minefields and clearance efforts, it was de-
termined that there is still considerable risk to the local pop-
ulation. Results indicated that an estimated 15 percent of the 
150,000 mines laid remain unaccounted for.1 To eliminate the 
risk that these remaining mines posed, NCDR planned and 
implemented a new Missing Mine Drill process.
Missing Mine Drill
Using this new process, project activities include post-
clearance sampling and verification on demined sites 
employing manual and mechanical teams according to the 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and the National 
Technical Standards and Guidelines. This type of sampling 
both identifies the level of risk in cleared sites and defines 
the fade-out area to be considered in the operational work 
plan for each task. Land release procedures for handing over 
land cleared or released as being verified and safe are applied 
accordingly.2 One of the main challenges was to accurately 
determine the location of the old minefields and its mine belts.
Challenges
Based on NCDR’s experience in the field, some of the great-
est challenges faced by demining personnel in determining the 
exact location of old minefields include the following:
* Flooding from the Jordan River leads to the displace-
ment of remaining mines and disturbs the minefield 
marks, often rendering them inaccurate and useless.
* Vague sketches of legacy minefields in the Jordan 
Valley do not provide comprehensive information on 
current minefield locations. Coordinates using the old 
mapping system represented an area of one or more 
Flooding moved this mine away from its original position in the 
minefield.
All photos courtesy of NCDR.
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square kilometers, whereas actual minefields are hun-
dreds of square meters wide. By using rough approxima-
tions and vague sketch marks to indicate topographical 
features, existing minefield sketches could potentially 
match multiple locations in the surrounding areas.
* Thick vegetation in contaminated areas makes identify-
ing landmarks or the nature of the terrain very difficult. 
This is made worse by the vegetation that has grown in 
the minefields over the years.
Solutions
Due to the difficult and dangerous nature of demining in 
the Jordan Valley, NCDR must compile all available informa-
tion in order to identify the exact locations of the minefields. 
To do this, NCDR will conduct field research such as inter-
viewing the local people about their knowledge of existing 
mines and searching for signs of a minefield, (i.e., barbed wire, 
fence pickets and any explosive remnants). NCDR will also ex-
amine and redraw sketches and documents of the original 
minefield. In particular, NCDR will use past military move-
ment in the Jordan Valley to determine where militaries would 
have found it most effective to lay mines. After this process, 
NCDR will redraw the original minefield on the ground and 
Jamal Odibat
Quality Management Office
Jordan National Committee for 
Demining and Rehabilitation
5 Dar Al Salam St., Zahran, Jabal Amman
Amman / Jordan
Tel: +962 6 585 9615 
Mobile: +962772257021
Email: j.odibat@ncdr.org.jo
Jamal Odibat is a quality 
management officer at the National 
Committee for Demining and 
Rehabilitation in Jordan, where 
he has worked for more than 
seven years. Odibat also spent 
12 years in the army conducting 
demining operations. He assisted in 
creating Jordan’s national standards for mine action 
in English and Arabic. Odibat holds a master’s degree 
in computer engineering from Yarmouk University 
(Jordan) and is currently serving as a reporting officer 
for Jordan’s monitoring and evaluation projects.
Thick vegetation in the minefield, Jordan River Valley.
study suspicious locations again. Once NCDR has sufficient 
information on the locations of these landmines, the sampling 
and verification process can begin. 
See endnotes page 67
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FLAIL TECHNOLOGY IN DEMINING
by Ashish Juneja [ Indian Institute of Technology Bombay ]
With the use of rollers, tillers and chain flails, the fo-cus of minefield clearance has shifted since the ear-ly 1980’s from military to humanitarian demining. 
These machines can clear 200–300 mm of soil depending on the 
speed of the vehicle and its configuration, the soil type and the 
terrain. As seen in Figure 1, a 200 mm depth can be cleared if 
the vehicle operates at 0.5 kph. Unfortunately, heavy machines are 
difficult to operate at these slow speeds unless large amounts of 
power are available to run and rotate the flails.1 Moreover, recent 
literature cites the use of modern technology in demining (e.g., 
infrared imaging, ground penetration radar, thermal neutron ac-
tivation and X-ray tomography). Mechanical machines, however, 
are still considered the safest tool for clearing minefields.
DEMINING MACHINES
Demining machines clear minefields by activating or outright 
destroying landmines. These are all-terrain vehicles, transport-
able and (partially) resistant to mine blasts.2 A large, steel-wheeled 
roller is a simple demining machine and uses the static load of 
its wheels to activate mines. Occasionally, a cam or a spring trig-
gered impacting tool is added to the roller to hammer the ground. 
However, these machines are not effective for all ground condi-
tions.3 Figure 2 shows a photograph of the Pearson mine roller.
Figure 2. The Pearson mine roller. 
Photo courtesy of Pearson Engineering.
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Figure 1. Typical relationship between speed and cutting depth of a light to 
medium demining machine in two different soil conditions.
Figure courtesy of author.
Figure 4. The MineWolf tiller. 
Photo courtesy of MineWolf.
Figure 3. The Keiler mine flail. 
Photo courtesy of Rheinmetall.
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Flails and tillers are the most common me-
chanical demining machines. With flails, attached 
chains with hammers are rotated using a horizon-
tal shaft, and the hammers impact or dig through 
the ground. While a large amount of dust and de-
bris can be generated during flailing, this action 
results in detonation or fragmentation of near-sur-
face mines. The rotation of the shaft is adjusted to 
optimize the digging depth. Results can improve 
if the chain-links are replaced by  single or multi-
lever links. Figure 3 shows the Keiler flail machine.
Tillers function similar to the flail systems. 
They use a rotating drum fitted with hardened 
chisels or teeth on its circumference to help dig or 
bite through the ground. The length of the chis-
el controls the clearance depth. A flexible knee 
joint helps increase the degree of freedom of the 
chisels and absorb most shocks. However, by do-
ing so, the productivity of the tillers is reduced. 
Tillers use large, powerful engines and tend to be 
heavy and difficult to maneuver. Tillers can be 
coupled with flails to destroy mines more reliably. They have been 
used in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. Figure 4 shows the 
MineWolf tiller machine.
CLASSIFICATION
Depending on their weight, demining machines are classified 
as light, medium or heavy.4 Light machines weigh less than 5 tons, 
are remotely operated and can clear 100 mm thick soil. The MV-4 
and Bozena (Series 1–4) are examples of light demining machines. 
Medium demining machines weigh up to 20 tons and are either 
remotely controlled or directly operated from its cabin. These ma-
chines can clear 200 mm thick soil layers. The RM-KA-01 and -02, 
Samson-300 and Hydrema-910 MCV are examples of medium de-
mining machines. Heavy demining machines weigh more than 
20 tons, use construction or military equipment as their under 
structure and are operated directly from the cabin. Some heavy 
machines can be equipped with double flails layers. Heavy ma-
chines can achieve a digging depth of over 200 mm. The Rhino-2, 
Zeus-1, Oracle and Scanjack-3500 are examples of heavy demin-
ing machines. Table 1 summarizes the significant differences be-
tween the light, medium and heavy demining machines. Tires of 
many light and medium machines are filled with foam or water 
to help absorb shock and to protect the vehicle in case of deto-
nation. Heavy vehicles have an armor shield and a double floor-
board to protect the vehicle and its operator. Table 2 (next page) 
summarizes the demining equipment. As the table shows, not all 
commercially available machines are suitable for every anticipated 
minefield condition.
Parameters Light Medium Heavy
Mine clearing capability AP and AT AP and AT AP and AT
Clearing/neutralizing  
mechanism specification 31 to 108 chains 48 to 72 chains 1 to 2 flail systems
Clearance width (mm) 1,100 to 2,100 2,000 to 3,500 2,700 to 4,000
Clearance depth (mm) 50 to 100 100 to 200 up to 300
Clearance rate (m2/h) 3,,700 highly variable 140 to 8000
Mode of motion Both track and wheel
Tracks most 
common Track and wheel
Mass of machine (kg) 2,500 to 7,000 7,800 to 18,000 32,000 to 35,500
Mass of flail unit (kg) unknown 1,500 to 4,300 8,300 to 19,900
Fuel requirement (l/h) 7 to 35 9 to 60 17 to 80
Maneuverability Very maneuverable Fairly good, limited  with increased size
Limited to heavy  
and bulky
Transportability By trailer/air or  self-propelled
By trailer or  
self-propelled
Need low-bed  
trailer
Control Remote Operator controlled  and remote Operator controlled
Table 1. Light, medium and heavy demining machines.4
All tables courtesy of author.
Figure 5. Types of hammers used in chain flails.
Figure courtesy of author.
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where σz is the vertical stress at depth z and radial distance r, and Q 
is the load at impact. Variable σz is calculated by assuming that the 
soil is elastic, homogeneous and isotropic. In reality though, most 
soils are non-elastic, heterogeneous and contain stones or plant 
roots, all of which can cause the hammers to wobble or meander 
over the ground. The problem is further complicated by the fact 
that the chain flails not only hit the ground but also cut through 
it. The energy demand to cut or shear through the ground can be 
very high. The effect of all these stresses cannot readily be incor-
porated within the framework of Equation 1. However, the results 
do permit a semi-empirical relation to be fitted to account for 
the state and consistency of the soil. The Equation is modified as 
where k is a soil dependent constant. Table 3 shows the value of k 
for different soils. Some researchers relate the soil con-
dition to the coefficient of restitution, CR defined as 
where v is the velocity of the hammer after the impact 
and u is the velocity of the hammer before the impact.5 Variable CR 
of zero implies that the entire energy is transferred to the ground. 
CR is greater than one if the hammer hits and explodes a land-
mine, to release large energy. In the usual case, CR varies between 
0.3 and 0.7, because part of the energy is utilized to cut through 
the soil.
Deming machines are subjected to wear and tear, and harsh 
environments, which limits the use of complex and expensive 
Dok-Ing  
MV-4
Bozena 
04
Minemill 
MC-2004
Bozena 
05 RM-KA-02
Aardvark 
Mark-4
Hydrema 
910 MCV-02
Dok-Ing 
MV-10 Mine-Wolf Mine-Wolf Rhino-02
Engine make Perkins 1106C-E60TA
Deutz BF 
4L913
Iveco turbo 
engine
Tatra 
T3A-928-30
Perkins 
1306-9T
New Holland 
TM165-T - -
Deutz 
engine
Perkins 
3012-26TA3 -
Power kW 129 98 190 170 168 121 272 - 270 663 656
Weight (tonnes) 5.6 6 9.6 11.4 12.5 15.2 18 18 21.8 33.5 58
Clearing speed 
kmph 0.5 to 2 - - - 0.3 to 0.9 0.2 to 1.1 1.4 3 0.8 to 1.5 2 1.3
Clearing width 
(mm) 1,725 2,225 2,000 2,810 2,000 3,500 3,500 - 2,800 3,400 3,000
Clearing depth 
 flail (mm) 200 250 250 300 300 250 200 350 150 300 250
Chain length (m) 410 - - - 450 - 1100 - 1210 1000 -
Number of flails - - 67 - 36 - 72 - - 82 -
Clearing depth 
tiller (mm) - - - - - - - 390 350 400 300
Rotating speed 
typical (rpm) 900 400 500 500 600 300 440 - - - 400
Performance 
 m2/hour
500 to 
2,000
520 to 
2,500
1,400 to 
2,000
1,050  to 
4,900
500 to 
2,000 - - - 2,800 5,000
750 to 
2,500
Fuel consumption 
(l/hour) 15 to 25 - - - 35 to 40 23 - 30 to 70 42 40 to 80 60 to 110
Table 2. Summary of the demining equipment. Note that “-” indicated data is unavailable or inapplicable.
FLAIL SYSTEM DESIGN
The magnitude of the impact force and the power required by 
the flails depends upon: 
• The forward speed of the vehicle 
• The chain configuration 
• The rotational speed 
• The depth of penetration 
• The impact angle 
• The soil type. 
At slow speeds, the footprints of the hammers overlap one 
another as they strike and cut through the soil. However, skip 
zones will occur if the vehicle moves at a fast speed. At high ve-
hicle speeds, the chains are no longer straight and tend to drag or 
wobble along the ground. The volume of the soil cut depends on 
the shape and size of the digging tool. Hammers with sharp ge-
ometry increase the penetration and movement through the soil. 
They also produce erratic impacts. On the other hand, smooth and 
spherical hammers produce consistent impact. 
The energy of the chain flail is calculated using the length and 
mass of the rotating assembly, and its angular velocity. The re-
peated impact transfers this energy to the ground. When the 
hammers impact, the vertical stress distribution in the ground 
is estimated using Boussinesq’s Equation, which is written as 
5
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equipment in most demining applications. Speed of the demining 
machine affects the quality of the demining operation. Although 
a slow machine increases productivity cost, its chain flails will not 
miss any areas, and the entire ground is cut during the impact 
process. The load at impact should detonate or fragment any mine 
within its zone of influence.
Large amounts of power are required to rotate the flails and pro-
pel the vehicle. This requirement increases the weight and size of 
the power-generating equipment. Heavy demining machines re-
quire powerful engines to overcome the topography and the soil 
conditions of any minefield. 
EXPERIMENT
With demining equipment, the energy available to cut through 
the ground depends upon the soil characteristics and the configu-
ration of the rotating chain flails. It may not be difficult to charac-
terize the soils using the principles of mechanics if the gradation, 
packing and stress history of the geomaterial are known. On the 
contrary, the flail configuration’s effect on the cutting resistance 
is often hard to perceive because of the complex interaction of the 
shape, size and rotational speed of the hammers, in addition to its 
impact angle and penetration depth. Although some of these com-
plexities can be reduced, they cannot be eliminated completely. 
The objective of this study is to estimate the energy utilized by 
the chain flails to cut through the soil. Laboratory tests were con-
ducted to investigate the effect of shape and rotational speed of the 
hammer on the energy transferred to the ground.
Soil beds were prepared in the laboratory using fine sand and 
clayey silt. Table 4 shows the properties of the two soils used in 
these tests. As can be seen, both the soils belong to Class I of CEN 
(European Committee for Standardization) Workshop Agreement 
(CWA) 15044 classification. In total, 34 test beds were pre-
pared by compacting the soil in a 1270-mm-long, 445-mm-wide, 
750-mm-tall, steel container. The samples were compacted in lay-
ers at their maximum dry density using a 2.5 kg rammer falling 
from a height of 300 mm until the container was completely filled.
After sample preparation, the container was carefully placed 
beneath the flail assembly, fixed to a pedestal. The flailing assem-
bly consisted of three 450-mm-long chains attached at 120 degrees 
to each other. The chains were rotated by a 415 V, 50 Hz and 20 HP 
induction motor, which was air-cooled during the tests. The setup 
was connected to a variable frequency drive to help maintain the 
motor speed during the flailing operation. The entire flail and mo-
tor assembly weighed about 180 kg when placed over the pedes-
tal. Figure 6 shows a photograph of the experimental setup. Also 
shown in the photograph is the safety cage to enclose the flails 
during rotation.
Hammers were attached to the free end of the chains. Figure 
7 (next page) shows the four different hammers used in the tests. 
Soil condition k
Elastic 3
Overconsolidated/hard soil 4
Slightly overconsolidated/dry soil 5
Normally consolidated/soft soil 6
Table 3. The relation between soil condition 
and k (soil dependent constant).
Soil
Proportion %
Liquid Limit 
(%)
Plastic 
Limit (%)
Dry unit 
weight 
(kN/m3)
Water 
content 
(%)
Shear strength 
parameters
Sand Silt Clay c  (kN/m2)
φ  
(degree)
Fine sand 100 - - 25 - 15 9 5 31
Clayey silt 19 67 14 30 23 18 12 40 28
Table 4. Soil properties for fine sand and clayey silt.
Figure 6. Experiment setup.
Figure courtesy of author.
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Each hammer weighed about 1 kg and was about 60 to 80 mm in diameter. It was perceived 
that the above spherical, cylindrical and mushroom shaped hammers would result in dif-
ferent soils resistance. During the test, the soil container was raised by 4 to 7 mm/s using 
a pallet truck to cut the soil using the three flails rotating at 150 to 550 rpm. In some tests, 
the pallet truck was replaced by a forklift to lift the soil container. The torque required by 
the motor to cut through the soil was recorded using an automated data logger. The test was 
stopped when over 250 mm thick soil was cut. Figure 8 shows a photograph of the soil con-
tainer after the test.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Figures 9 through 12 (next page), and Figures 13 through 16 (page 60) show the torque 
versus the depth of cut in fine sand and clayey silt, respectively for the different rotor 
speeds. As expected, the measured torque in clayey silt was more than that in fine sand 
Figure 7. Hammers used in test.
Figure courtesy of author.
Figure 8. Soil container after test using Mushroom-I hammers in clayey silt.
Figure courtesy of author.
tests. The torque increased with the in-
crease in the size of the cut to reach a peak 
toward the end of the tests. The figures 
show that Spherical hammers required the 
largest torque and hence offered the great-
est resistance to shear the soil, followed by 
Mushroom-II hammers. These findings 
also indicate that T and Mushroom-I ham-
mers are more efficient to cut through the 
soil without causing a significant spike in 
the power demand.
Figure 17 (page 61) shows the surface 
area of the soil bed cut by the flails. In the 
figure, the area of the circular segment, A1 
is given by
where R is the radius of the chain-flail 
(equal to 450 mm) and x is the depth of the 
cut after each revolution. Variable x equals 
the relative motion between the flails and 
the soil bed. Because there are two sides of 
the circular segment, the total surface area 
of the circular segments is equal to 2A1.
Figure 17 also shows the surface area 
produced by the hammer’s width. This 
area is generated at the base of the arc and 
is given by 
where A2 is the area produced by the ham-
mer along the arch and d is the average 
diameter of the hammer. Since the over-
burden is small and insignificant, the ef-
fect of the vertical stress component on 
the shear resistance can be ignored. The 
cutting resistance or the force to shear 
through the soil can therefore be written as 
 where c is the cohesion com-
ponent of the shear strength (see Table 4).
Figure 18 (page 63) compares the cut-
ting resistance deduced from Equation 6 
with Mikulic’s equations for loose/soft and 
compact/stiff deposits.6 In Figure 18, the 
depth of the cut, x, is normalized by the 
length of the chord AB (see Figure 17). As 
Figure 18 shows, Mikulic’s equation tends 
2
1212
1 xRx2xRR
xRCosRA −−−−= − Eq.4
d
R
xR2x
Sin2RA 12
−
= −
( (√
Eq.5
[ ]21 AA2cF += Eq.6
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Figures 9–12. Torque versus depth of cut in fine sand using: (a) Spherical hammers, (b) T hammers, (c) Mushroom-I hammers and 
(d) Mushroom-II hammers.
Figures courtesy of author.
to slightly overpredict the results of both the soils from about mid 
depth.6 Some difference between the two predictions also exists at 
shallow depths in clayey silt. But then, the difference is less than 
10% and is considered to be within the acceptable range.
Since the effect of F in Equation 6 is to cut and remove the 
soil up to the surface, the work done or the energy, E1 is equal 
to [ ]HAA2cE 211 +=  where H is equal to the depth of the cut (see 
Figure 17). E1 will be the maximum (E1max) when H is equal to 
250 mm, and A1 and A2 are measured in the last cycle. In addition, 
the energy to lift the 3 hammers in one revolution, E2 is written as 
mgR6E2 = .
Therefore the maximum torque, T required to cut through the 
soil bed is equal to 
π2
2max1 EET +=
Ito and Fujimoto suggested that T in Equation 9 be increased 
by 15% because of the impact loading.7 Watanabe and Kusakabe 
(2013) observed that the increase was not uniform but varied from 
0% to 10% under high frequency loads in different soils.8 Because 
Eq.7
Eq.8
Eq.9
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Figures 13–16. Torque versus depth of cut in clayey silt using: (a) Spherical hammers, (b) T hammers, (c) Mushroom-I hammers and  
(d) Mushroom-II hammers.
Figures courtesy of author.
of the above uncertainties, the torque was varied from 1T to 1.15T 
in the above Equation. Figures 19 and 20 show the torque calcu-
lated using Equation 9 for rotor speed of 150 to 600 rpm. The ef-
fect of the impact loading on the calculated torque is shown as a 
thick blue curve in the two figures. Figures 19 and 20 (page 61) 
also show the maximum measured torque deduced from Figures 9 
through 16 for Spherical, T, Mushroom-I and Mushroom-II ham-
mers. As can be seen, the calculated torque significantly underesti-
mates the measured torque, the difference being more in fine sand 
tests. Also noteworthy is the scatter in the measured data. While 
some difference between the measured and calculated torques can 
be attributed to the effect of the chain and its weight, it still cannot 
explain the significant spread in the data. Because of low confin-
ing pressures, it is also unlikely that the soil particles would have 
crushed under the impact thereby increasing the measurement. 
The difference can be resolved by further adjusting the calcu-
lated torque for high frequency loads. However, as Figure 21 sug-
gests, the ratio of the measured and calculated torque is somewhat 
unaffected by the rotor speed. This imposes a limit on the ad-
justment, which would otherwise unrealistically model the soil 
yielding. Unfortunately, this procedure will not help tighten the 
observed data. One possible reason to explain the discrepancy is 
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Figure 17. Surface area of the soil bed cut by the flails.
Figure courtesy of author.
Figure 18. Cutting resistance of the soils.
Figure courtesy of author.
Figure 19. Torque calculated in fine sand.
Figures courtesy of author.
that when the soil flows past the hammer during impact, it has a 
tendency to dilate or expand, resulting in an increased penetra-
tion resistance. Dilation can be significantly high in fine sands. 
The buildup of pressure bulb ahead of the hammer and the ten-
dency of the soil to dilate, depends upon the shape of the ham-
mer. Spherical shapes mobilize significantly high resistance loads 
compared to shapes that have sharp edges.9 These effects cannot 
readily be incorporated in the simple framework but do permit a 
semi-empirical fit to the measured torque. Equation 9 can now be 
modified as
 
π
+
α=
2
EET 2max1
  
Soil Hammer α
Clayey silt Spherical 1.6
T 1.2
Mushroom I 1.3
Mushroom II 1.4
Fine sand Spherical 2.9
T 2.1
Mushroom I 1.9
Mushroom II 2.6
Table 5. Parameter α in clayey silt and fine sand.
Figure 20. Torque calculated in clayey silt.
Eq.10
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Figure 21. Ratio of measured and calculated torque versus rotor 
speed.
Figure courtesy of author.
where α is a fitted parameter. Table 5 shows the value of α for the four 
hammers in fine sand and clayey silt.
Figure 22 compares the measured and the modified calculated 
torques using Equation 10. As can be seen, the measured torque is now 
reasonably well predicted, indicating that the data can be accommo-
dated within a highly deterministic framework.
CONCLUSION
The discussion presented data relating to the effect of the soil type 
and the shape of the hammer on the energy transferred to the ground. 
The results showed that the torque required to flail through clayey silt 
was about twice to that required in fine sand. Spherical shaped ham-
mers utilized the maximum torque in both the soils. The least resis-
tance was observed with Cylindrical and Mushroom-I shapes. Torque 
calculated using Mohr Coulomb shear failure criterion underestimated 
the measured torque. This is partly attributed to the shape and size of 
the hammer, which cannot readily be incorporated within the above 
framework. However, the results do permit a semi-empirical relation to 
be fitted to the data. 
See endnotes page 67
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Figure 22. Comparison of the measured torque to the modified cal-
culated torque.
Figure courtesy of author.
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MAXIMIZING THE EFFECTIVENESS 
OF MOBILE TECHNOLOGY
by Colonel (U.S. Army, retired) Howard M. Rudat [ MAPPS, Inc. ] 
Mobile technology has transformed the way we live our lives and has the potential to dramatically assist in de-mining. However, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
systems coupled with explosive remnants of war (ERW) related 
applications leave capability gaps and create potential risks that 
must be closed. A more tailored and deliberate ecosystem ap-
proach when employing mobile technology will yield greater ben-
efits and avoid the problems encountered when Alexa, Cortana, 
Google Now or Siri do not provide the necessary information. 
It seems that at the times when you need information the most, 
the smart personal assistants provided by Google, Apple and 
Microsoft either provide you with information that isn’t relevant 
or they don’t provide any information because you do not have a 
strong enough cell signal to ask them a question.  
Since 2010, a diverse team of project managers, software de-
velopers, system engineers and testers have supported a U.S. 
Department of Defense program to determine how best to in-
tegrate commercial mobile technology into the military. The 
challenges and successes of the team resulted in over 3,000 sol-
diers adopting the capability in support of Operation Enduring 
Freedom.1 Moreover, the team identified the key attributes neces-
sary to make mobile technology a viable tool for the demining and 
ERW eradication communities. 
Smartphones have made significant impacts in our day-to-day 
lives. A critical component to the success of this technology is a 
reliable and robust network that greatly enhances the usability 
and functionality of these devices while also providing manage-
ment and security functions from a back-end infrastructure. We 
frequently see the limitations of standalone devices when we ven-
ture into an area with no or degraded service, or place our devices 
in Airplane mode. Only when we cannot access a map or commu-
nicate with others do we fully appreciate the reachback capability 
as an essential component of mobile technology. These limitations 
could have catastrophic effects when a device is being used to navi-
gate, maintain situational awareness or develop a common opera-
tional picture to support a military operation. 
The program identified the need for a full ecosystem approach 
to mobile technology in order to insure uninterrupted support 
for our mobile users in Afghanistan. To that end, the ecosystem 
provides onboard maps (aerial imagery), a customized operating 
Figure 1. Heatmap depicting areas where project’s mobile devices were most frequently located.
All graphics courtesy of the author.
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system providing both security and usability en-
hancements, an integrated framework that allows 
applications and functions to work seamlessly to-
gether and a user-defined, customized suite of 
applications tailored to the mission, made avail-
able through the system’s marketplace. When 
on a network, functionality such as messaging 
and viewing the location of other personnel us-
ing the devices becomes available. Although the 
added security measures to protect information 
exchange within the military may not be needed 
for demining and ERW activities, a system that is 
100 percent reliable and tailored for tactical op-
erations is needed.
Small commercial drones equipped with cam-
eras capture high-resolution imagery up to 0.3 mm per pixel, con-
vert it into a mobile friendly format using tiling software to create 
a mosaic dataset from the imagery tiles and have it available for 
use on a mobile device in less than five hours. This process involves 
taking a poorly mapped area and transforming it into a highly ac-
curate, near real time visualized operational area. Using planning 
software, the team transforms this imagery into a clearly marked 
area with sweep lanes, restricted areas and any other graphical de-
pictions needed to accomplish the mission. Personnel equipped 
with mobile devices can also add information, such as mine loca-
tions and use the camera, video and audio recording functions of 
the smartphone to further capture critical information. Devices 
are fully customizable to allow the inclusion of libraries and da-
tabases of information (e.g., the Collaborative ORDnance Data 
Repository) on mines and other ERW to allow for easy identifica-
tion as well as training and education purposes.  
The scalability of the ecosystem enhances its functionality. 
Something as simple as an ordnance ID guide in the form of an 
app to assist the local population in identifying potential hazards 
could be distributed via hardware provided by a relief or humani-
tarian organization or uploaded to an individual’s personal de-
vice. The next level of capability could add a reporting tool for the 
found ordnance. Using this approach, what would begin as a sin-
gle capability could grow over time as resources and needs the cre-
ation of an entire demining and ERW eradication planning, 
execution and reporting tool. Regardless of how basic or advanced 
the tools you employ, the result is the same: a safer environment 
for the area’s residents.  
See endnotes page 67
Mobile technology in use in Afghanistan.
Figure 2. Common operating picture from the 2015 Boston Marathon.
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Implementing International Obligations to Clear Mines, by Casey-Maslen [ from page 5 ]
1. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction. United Nations. 
Accessed 20 June 2016. http://bit.ly/1w99Ek7. 
Mobile Data Collection: Interoperability Through New Architecture, by Vinek, Mukahhal and Cottray [ from page 7 ] 
1. “TIRAMISU Information Management Tool – T-IMS.” TIRAMISU Information Center (2013). Accessed 27 April 2016. http://bit.ly/1TwBiCo. 
2. Curatella F., Vinetti P., Rizzo G.; Vladimirova T., De Vendictis L., Emter T., Petereit J., Frey C., Usher D., Stanciugelu I., Schaefer J.,  Den Breejen 
E., Gisslén L., Letalick D. “Toward a multifaceted platform for Humanitarian Demining.” 12 International Symposium Mine Action 2015. ISSN 
1849-3718.
3. Bold, Mikael. “Information Management and Technology Development for Technical Survey in Mine Action.” EOD and C-IED (2015). Accessed 
27 April 2016. http://bit.ly/1TwBOR1. 
4. “Mine Action Intelligence Tool (MINT).” Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (August 2014). Accessed 27 April 2016. http://
bit.ly/1YTE1r8.  
From the Field: Mobile Technologies for Mine Action, by Vikström [ from page 12 ]
5. TIRAMISU: Humanitarian Demining Toolbox. Accessed 3 June 2016. http://www.fp7-tiramisu.eu/.
6. ESRI. Accessed 3 June 2016. http://www.esri.com/.
7. Carmenta. Accessed 3 June 2016. http://www.carmenta.com/.
8. CORD. Center for International Stabilization and Recovery. Accessed 3 June 2016. http://ordata.info/.
9. GICHD. Accessed 3 June 2016. http://www.gichd.org/imsma.
10. IMAS. Accessed 3 June 2016. http://www.mineactionstandards.org/.
11. HCR, Croatian Mine Action Centre. Accessed 3 June 2016. http://www.hcr.hr/.
12. CMAA Database Unit in Phnom Penh.
13. OpenStreetMap. Accessed 3 June 2016. http://www.openstreetmap.org/.
Mobile Technology in Mine Action: The Fulcrum Application, by Wallen and Torbet [ from page 17 ]
1. Creighton, Michael, Atle Karlsen and Mohammad Qasim. “Cluster Munition Remnant Survey in Laos.” The Journal of ERW and Mine Action, No. 
17.2 (Summer 2013). Accessed 5 May 2016. http://bit.ly/1fARvnS.
Integrated Cooperation on Explosive Hazards Program in Central Asia, by Buhin [ from page 24 ]
1. Explosive hazards include: unexploded and abandoned munitions including landmines; unsecured, excess and unserviceable munitions; and the 
presence of booby traps and improvised explosive devices.
2. Since the OSCE OiT had limited experience in applying the regional approach in Mine Action, ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF) had been 
contracted at that time to carry out numerous rounds of technical consultations and events throughout Central Asia in order to mobilize countries 
in the region to partake in joint cooperation efforts.
3. Linn, Johannes F. and Oksana Pidufala. “The Experience with Regional Economic Cooperation Organizations: Lessons for Central Asia.” Assessed 
9 May 2016. http://brook.gs/1QWJ30b. 
Afghanistan’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan (2016–2021), by Oriakhil [ from page 33 ]
1. “Afghanistan.” Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor. Last modified November 29, 2015. http://bit.ly/1TFHLuP.
2. “Afghanistan’s Landmine-removal Extension Request.” Journal of ERW and Mine Action (2013). Accessed 3 May 2016. http://bit.ly/1pY9xbx.  
3. “Landmine Monitor 2015.” Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (May 2015). Accessed 3 May 2016. http://bit.ly/1rR7AQ1. 
4. “Afghanistan Casualties and Victim Assistance.” Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (August 2015). Accessed 3 May 2016. http://bit.
ly/1VIk9t2. 
5. “Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan Mine Action Strategic Guideline 2008–2013.” Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan. Accessed 2 May 
2016. http://bit.ly/1QNi4nF. 
6. “UNMACA Fast Facts: January to March 2016 (1394 fourth quarter).” UNMACA/UNMAS. Accessed 5 May 2016. http://bit.ly/1WKSQNN.
7. “Mine Action in Afghanistan: The Way Ahead.” Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Accessed 2 May 2016. http://bit.ly/1NORyQ1.
8. SWOT analysis (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats).
9. PESTLE analysis (political, economic, social, technological, legal, environmental).
The UXO Sector in Laos, by Peachey [ from page 37 ]
1. “Lao PDR.” Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, 2013–2015. Accessed 9 May 2016. http://bit.ly/1rD4uyF. 
2. “Over 500 People Killed or Injured by UXO Since 2009.” Vientiane Times (12 February 2016). Accessed 9 May 2016. http://bit.ly/1T17VWM.
3. UXO Sector Working Group Progress Report, Vientiane, Laos, November 15, 2015.
4. “Lao PDR.” Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, 2009–2015. Accessed 9 May 2016. http://bit.ly/1rD4uyF. 
5. Creighton, Michael, Atle Karlsen, and Mohammed Qasim. “Cluster Munition Remnant Survey in Laos.” The Journal of ERW and Mine Action, 
Issue 17.3, Summer 2013. Accessed 4 May 2016. http://bit.ly/1fARvnS.
6. “Support for the Institutional Strengthening of the Lao National UXO Programme (UXO Lao), January 2016.” United Nations Development 
Program Project Brief. Summary available at:  http://bit.ly/1XhlE0O. 
7. National Regulatory Authority for UXO/Mine Action Sector in Lao PDR. “HRTM 2015: UXO Sector Working Group Progress Report.” Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic National Round Table Process (November 15, 2015). Accessed 3 May 2016. http://bit.ly/1NW1lnJ.
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8. “NRA Plans Future UXO Operations.” Vientiane Times (17 November 2015). Accessed 2 May 2016. http://bit.ly/1pBBKVj.
9. Personal conversation with MAG deminers Steve Povah and Donald McDonald in 1994.
10. “Action Document for Support to the National Strategy Plan for Unexploded Ordnances.” Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual 
Action Programme 2015 Part 2 and Annual Action Programme 2016 Part 1 for Lao People’s Democratic Republic. Accessed 4 May 2016. http://
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11. Email correspondence with Isabelle Bouan of Cope.
12. “Lao PDR.” Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor. Accessed 4 May 2016. http://bit.ly/233y2kw.
13. To Walk the Earth in Safety, 2015, U.S. Department of State. Accessed 4 May 2016. http://1.usa.gov/1T27qeh.
14. “US Planning to Increase Funding for UXO Clearance.” Vientiane Times (26 February 2016). Accessed 4 May 2016. http://bit.ly/21xvTOT. 
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Issue 21.1 
Articles due 1 October 2016
Publication: March 2017
SPOTLIGHT
East Africa
What CWD programs are currently operat-
ing in the East African countries of Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Mozambique, Kenya, Somalia, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe? How does the 
presence of nonstate actors such as Al 
Shabaab and Al Qaeda affect the security 
situation for organizations on the ground? 
FEATURE
Improvised Explosive Devices 
(IED) & Pressure Plate IEDs
As the number one cause of military casual-
ties, IEDs are now also becoming one of the 
greatest threats to civilians. How are tradi-
tional humanitarian CWD programs dealing 
with the increasing prevalence of  IEDs  and 
pressure plate IEDs? Recognizing CWD in 
this context is humanitarian assistance and 
different from military/security counter-IED 
efforts, are there lessons learned from 
clearance in counter-IED activities applica-
ble to the traditional CWD community?  
SPECIAL REPORT
Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 Years On
Following the end of the Bosnian War in 
December 1995 and the Balkan floods 
of May 2014, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
continues to suffer from landmines and 
explosive remnants of war contamination. 
The Journal is seeking articles on lessons 
learned and remaining challenges for 
ongoing programs in the region.
Issue 21.2 
Articles due 1 February 2017
Publication: July 2017
SPOTLIGHT
Southeast Asia
How are international NGOs and national 
mine action operators in Southeast Asia ad-
dressing threats? What has changed in the 
way data is collected and analyzed? What 
lessons learned can be shared with the 
broader CWD community?
Of particular interest are: Burma, Cambodia, 
Laos, Nepal, Thailand and Vietnam.
FEATURE
Evolving Nature of Survey
How has the prevalence of mobile tech-
nology changed the survey documentation 
process? What are some of the successes 
and challenges faced by CWD organizations 
when conducting surveys? How is the scope 
of a country’s contamination measured? 
How is quality assurance measured prior to 
land release?
Issue 21.3
Articles due 1 July 2017
Publication: November 2017
SPOTLIGHT
Western Hemisphere
How have negotiations between govern-
ments and nonstate armed groups affected 
the demining process in Central and South 
America? What lessons learned can be tak-
en from the ongoing demining operations 
conducted by military forces and their col-
laboration with newly accredited civilian 
deminers? 
FEATURE
Physical Security and Stockpile 
Management (PSSM)
What are the most common challenges 
faced by organizations attempting to curb 
the spread of illicit small arms and weap-
ons? What lessons learned can be shared 
with the broader community? Potential 
topics relating to PSSM include ammunition 
disposal, stockpile management, surplus re-
duction, improved marking and tracing ca-
pabilities, and the destruction of illicit and 
obsolete SA/LW.
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